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SILENCE OF THE LIBERALS: WHEN SUPREME COURT
JUSTICES FAIL TO SPEAK UP FOR LGBT RIGHTS
David S. Cohen *
ABSTRACT
In 1985, Justice Brennan did something that had never been done before and
has, surprisingly, never been done again—penned a separate opinion from the
Court’s left vigorously arguing for the protection of gay rights under the Constitution. Since then, even though the Court has repeatedly protected gay rights,
none of the Court’s liberal Justices have said a word on the topic. Rather, the
liberal Justices have ceded the territory on the issue of the Constitution and gay
rights almost entirely to Justice Kennedy’s notoriously flowery but somewhat
vacuous statements about the issue, as well as the pointed and often homophobic critiques of the Court’s more conservative Justices.
This liberal silence has been costly. Court developments around gay rights have
been one of many factors contributing to the drastic change in this country with
respect to accepting gay people and treating them more equally. Concurring
opinions could have been a part of this judicial influence, both in society and
in lower court doctrine, but the liberal Justices have opted to remain silent. By
doing so, they have lost an opportunity to use separate opinions to influence the
trajectory of the law on gay and trans rights, solidify the societal and legal
gains that may be threatened by Justice Kennedy’s departure from the Court,
clarify Justice Kennedy’s vague analysis, and counter the stereotypes and bigotry of the dissenting opinions.

* Professor of Law, Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law. Thank you to
Professor Leonore Carpenter for her valuable feedback on this article, as well as to Sarah
Varney and Alice Thornewill for excellent research assistance.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1974, Marjorie Rowland, a public high school guidance counselor, confided in her colleagues that she was bisexual. 1 She was at
work when her secretary asked her why she was in such a good
mood, and Marjorie told her that she was in love with a woman. 2
Her secretary was not happy with this answer, nor was the parent
of a student whom Marjorie had earlier counseled to accept her
son’s sexual orientation. 3 When her supervisors found out about
her sexual orientation, Marjorie was suspended from her position
midyear and then not rehired for the next year. 4 Marjorie sued,
and the district court found that the school district had violated
Marjorie’s constitutional rights to free speech and equal protection. 5 After the Sixth Circuit reversed on appeal, 6 the Supreme
Court refused to hear Marjorie’s case. 7
This somewhat obscure denial of certiorari from 1985 has been
mostly forgotten, especially as the Court has forged a different
path forward for gay rights 8 under the Constitution. However, one
part of the Court’s action remains important and unique, even in
light of recent advances. Accompanying the denial of certiorari in
Rowland v. Mad River Local School District was a dissenting opinion from Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, that has
proven to be a historical rarity on the Supreme Court: an opinion
from a liberal Justice about gay rights.
In that separate opinion, Justice Brennan gave a roadmap of
how to protect gay rights under the Constitution’s Equal Protection
Clause. Discrimination against gay people, Justice Brennan wrote,
“raises significant constitutional questions” because sexual orientation is a suspect class and because discrimination interferes with

1. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1009, 1016 n.11 (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
2. Id. at 1016 n.11.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1009–10.
5. Id. at 1010.
6. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 446 (6th Cir. 1984).
7. Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1009.
8. Throughout this article, I use the term “gay rights” to encompass many different
rights related to sexual orientation, among them, privacy, autonomy, dignity, and equality.
I generally use this term instead of the broader term “LGBT rights” (lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender rights) because the Supreme Court cases that I analyze do not involve
transgender rights, an issue I discuss at length in Part IV.
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a fundamental right. 9 On the suspect class point, Justice Brennan
explained that gay people are “a significant and insular minority”
who “are particularly powerless to pursue their rights” and “have
historically been the object of pernicious and sustained hostility”
based on “deep-seated prejudice.” 10 On the fundamental right
point, Justice Brennan noted that discrimination against gay people often implicates the rights to privacy and free expression. 11 Justice Brennan concluded that he had “serious doubt” that the Sixth
Circuit’s overturning of the trial verdict “can be upheld under any
standard of equal protection review.” 12
What makes this opinion historically important is that nothing
like this has happened again on the Court. Over the past threeplus decades, the Supreme Court has decided five cases that directly addressed constitutional recognition of gay rights. Bowers v.
Hardwick, the Court’s first foray into the topic, infamously rejected
a claim that the right to privacy extends to sexual conduct between
gay people. 13 After that misstep, the Court reversed course in a series of four decisions that all found for the gay rights claimant: rejecting a state constitutional amendment that banned antidiscrimination laws in Romer v. Evans; 14 striking down a state law
prohibiting same-sex sexual activity in Lawrence v. Texas (and
overturning Bowers in the process); 15 overturning a federal law defining marriage as between a man and a woman in United States
v. Windsor; 16 and striking down state bans on same-sex marriage
in Obergefell v. Hodges. 17
Each of these four cases has two things in common: (1) the majority opinion was written by Justice Kennedy; and (2) the case had
no separate opinion from any of the Court’s liberals. In contrast,
every Justice in the Court’s ideological middle and on the right—
other than Chief Justice Rehnquist—wrote a separate opinion in
these cases. Justice O’Connor, Justice Kennedy’s partner in the
Court’s middle, wrote a concurring opinion in Lawrence on limited

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1014–15.
Id. at 1014.
Id. at 1015.
Id. at 1017.
478 U.S. 186, 190–91 (1986).
517 U.S. 620, 623–24, 631–32 (1996).
539 U.S. 558, 567, 578 (2003).
570 U.S. 744, 751–52 (2013).
576 U.S. __, __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
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equality grounds, and several of the Court’s conservative Justices
wrote multiple opinions attacking gay rights. Yet the liberals remained silent.
Meanwhile, in a separate line of cases, the Court has consistently recognized the First Amendment rights of people who oppose
gay equality. In these three cases, the Court allowed a St. Patrick’s
Day parade to exclude an Irish gay rights group in Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 18 the Boy
Scouts of America to exclude a gay scoutmaster in Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale, 19 and a cake shop owner to refuse to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission. 20
Amidst these three First Amendment opinions, one of the
Court’s liberal voices did chime in about gay rights, but only superficially, and without any doctrinal analysis. In his dissent in Dale,
Justice Stevens wrote about how changing attitudes are evidence
of greater acceptance for gay people and how prejudice against
them causes “serious and tangible harm.” 21 Interestingly, although
each of the other liberals joined Justice Stevens’s dissent, Justice
Souter wrote a separate dissent joined by Justices Ginsburg and
Breyer that called changed attitudes “laudable” but legally irrelevant. 22 Justices Kagan and Ginsburg also wrote separate opinions
in Masterpiece Cakeshop, but those opinions did not directly address gay rights. 23
In other words, across the expanses of the Supreme Court’s modern constitutional gay rights jurisprudence, no liberal Justice has
done what Justice Brennan did in 1985 in his dissent to the denial
of certiorari in Marjorie Rowland’s case—put forth a substantive
argument for constitutional protection for gay rights. Rather, the
liberal Justices have ceded the territory on the issue of the Constitution and gay rights almost entirely to Justice Kennedy’s notoriously flowery but somewhat vacuous statements about the issue,

18. 515 U.S. 557, 559–60 (1995).
19. 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
20. 584 U.S. __, __, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723–24 (2018).
21. 530 U.S. at 699–700 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 700–01 (Souter, J., dissenting).
23. 584 U.S. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1732 (Kagan, J., concurring); id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at
1748–49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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as well as the pointed and often homophobic critiques of the Court’s
more conservative Justices.
This liberal silence has been costly. Court developments around
gay rights have been one of many factors contributing to the drastic
change in this country with respect to the acceptance and equal
treatment of gay people. 24 Concurring opinions could have been a
part of this judicial influence, both in society and in lower court
doctrine. Instead, the liberal Justices have opted to remain silent.
By doing so, they lost an opportunity to use separate opinions to
influence the trajectory of the law on gay and trans rights, solidify
the societal and legal gains that may be threatened in the wake of
Justice Kennedy’s departure from the Court, clarify Justice Kennedy’s vague analysis, and counter the stereotypes and bigotry of
the dissenting opinions.
Before going further, a short note about terminology throughout
this article: I will be using the terminology of “conservative,” “middle,” and “liberal” to describe Justices. This terminology comes
from the widely used Martin-Quinn scores, 25 which measure the
relative ideological tendencies of Supreme Court Justices based on
case outcomes. The more positive (above 0) the Martin-Quinn
score, the more conservative the Justice, while the more negative
(below 0) the score, the more liberal the Justice. Justices with
scores around 0 are in the middle. 26 Because the scale is relative,
the median Justice is not necessarily reaching politically moderate
results, but rather is reaching results that are in the middle of the
nine Justices on the Supreme Court at the time. 27
Based on the publicly available data set, 28 during the times most
relevant to this article (1995 through the end of the 2017 term,
when the last relevant case was decided), the Justices aligned
roughly as follows (alphabetically within each group):
24. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Varieties of Constitutional Experience: Democracy and the
Marriage Equality Campaign, 64 UCLA L. REV. 1662, 1726 (2017); Anthony Michael Kreis,
Stages of Constitutional Grief: Democratic Constitutionalism and the Marriage Revolution,
20 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 871, 896 (2018).
25. Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134, 145
(2002).
26. Id.
27. Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court,
83 N.C. L. REV. 1275, 1299–1300 (2005).
28. Measures, MARTIN-QUINN SCORES, http://mqscores.lsa.umich.edu/measures.php
[https://perma.cc/G6BV-S7B2] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019).
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Conservative: Alito, Gorsuch, Rehnquist, Roberts, Scalia, Thomas
Middle: Kennedy, O’Connor
Liberal: Breyer, Ginsburg, Kagan, Stevens, Sotomayor, Souter

Other methods exist to attach general ideological labels to Supreme Court Justices, 29 but the specific differences among these
are not relevant, as it is largely uncontroversial among all systems—as well as consistent with conventional wisdom—to categorize this group of Justices as I do here.
This article makes the argument that the failure of liberal Justices to use separate opinions to put forth a more robust argument
for constitutional protection of gay rights has harmed and will continue to harm the push for LGBT equality, and proceeds as follows.
First, in Part I, starting with Bowers and progressing through this
past term’s Masterpiece Cakeshop, I briefly review and then synthesize the Court’s decisions in the eight constitutional cases that
have shaped gay rights. Particular emphasis is placed on the ways
in which the Court’s jurisprudence has had outcome clarity but
much less jurisprudential clarity. Next, in Part II, I explore the
separate nonmajority opinions in the gay rights cases, which have
been almost exclusively from the conservative side of the Court,
with almost no liberal opinions addressing substantive issues of
gay rights. Part III then develops an argument about the types of
concurring opinions that the liberals could have written, drawing
on the literature from legal and political science scholars around
separate opinion writing. Part IV next argues that, based on the
literature about the impact of concurring opinions on lower courts
and the Supreme Court, by failing to take advantage of the opportunity, liberal Justices have harmed the development of several
different areas of the law, while leaving virtually unanswered the
stigmatizing rhetoric of the conservative dissents in this area. This
article concludes with thoughts about why the liberal Justices have
remained silent and what this silence means for the Court going
forward, especially as it is about to decide three important Title
VII cases in this area.

29. See generally Elliott Ash & Daniel L. Chen, What Kind of Judge Is Brett Kavanaugh?: A Quantitative Analysis, 2018 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 70, 72–77 (surveying
the different approaches within the literature and then later in the article offering their own
approach).
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I. MAJORITY OPINIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT’S
CONSTITUTIONAL GAY RIGHTS CASES
There have been eight major decisions from the Supreme Court
addressing the Constitution and gay rights. 30 The first ruled
against protecting gay rights, but then four others that directly addressed the issue reversed the earlier precedent and advanced constitutional support for gay rights. Beyond those five cases that directly confronted the issue, the Court addressed the issue more
indirectly in a series of three cases. In each of these cases, the
Court found that those who oppose gay rights have First Amendment rights that are protected under the Constitution, even in the
face of a local antidiscrimination law requiring equality.
On the surface, these majority opinions produced clear outcomes
that had broad and significant effects on gay people’s lives. After
the initial ruling allowed states to continue to criminalize samesex sexual activity, the four subsequent decisions shifted the landscape of gay rights. These cases struck down state and federal laws
that limited gay rights in antidiscrimination law, sexual activity,
and marriage. On the flipside, the three cases indirectly involving
gay rights all broadened the rights of private individuals or organizations to discriminate against gay people.
But while the outcome in each of these cases was clear and significant, the jurisprudence of gay rights that emerged remains
much less so. In each of these cases, the Court was presented with
many core questions about how gay rights fit under the Constitution, as well as other aspects of the law. Instead of resolving many
of these questions that could have helped guide the legal landscape
of the constitutional treatment of sexual orientation and gender
identity going forward, the Court’s majority opinions were long on
30. I am limiting my analysis to these constitutional cases because they presented the
greatest opportunity for Justices to speak about gay rights. Therefore, I am not addressing
cases such as Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998), a statutory case involving same-sex sexual harassment under Title VII, or Snyder v. Phelps, 562
U.S. 443, 454 (2011), a First Amendment case involving derogatory language about sexual
orientation targeted at a funeral unrelated to sexual orientation. Nor am I addressing the
short per curiam decision in Pavan v. Smith, 582 U.S. __, __, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017)
(per curiam), which clarified an important aspect of marriage equality but did not purport
to break any new doctrinal ground (although some scholars think it did; see, for example,
Cary Franklin, Biological Warfare: Constitutional Conflict over “Inherent Differences” Between the Sexes, 2017 SUP. CT. REV. 169, 173). I am also not including Baker v. Nelson, 409
U.S. 810, 810 (1972), in the discussion because that case, though a clear rebuke to a claim
of gay rights, was a one-line dismissal on jurisdictional grounds.
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lofty language about dignity and liberty but short on useful doctrinal analysis. This part reviews these cases and the uncertainty left
in their wake. 31
A. Bowers v. Hardwick
After repeatedly opting to stay out of the issue of constitutional
gay rights by issuing summary decisions or denying certiorari, 32
the Supreme Court finally confronted the issue in Bowers v. Hardwick. 33 Bowers raised the question of whether a state statute that
prohibited homosexual sodomy violated the Constitution. Even
though the statute at issue prohibited sodomy for everyone, regardless of sexual orientation, Justice White’s majority opinion limited
the issue under consideration to the application of the statute upon
the litigant before the Court, a gay man who had sex with another
man. 34
On that specific question, a five-Justice majority ruled that there
was no constitutionally protected right at stake in the case. Justice
White wrote that none of the past fundamental rights recognized
by the Court “bears any resemblance” to the right at issue. 35 Those
past cases involved “family, marriage, or procreation,” while Bowers, according to Justice White, concerned “homosexual activity.” 36
The opinion stated that the two rights are completely different, so
precedent did not protect the claimed right. 37

31. For a review of these landmark cases to set the stage for the rest of the article, see
infra Parts I.A–C. Readers already well-versed in this series of cases may skip to Part I.D,
which explains the jurisprudential uncertainty that resulted from these decisions.
32. See Christopher R. Leslie, The Importance of Lawrence in the Context of the Supreme Court’s Historical Treatment of Gay Litigants, 11 WIDENER L. REV. 189, 214 (2005)
(reviewing the fate of early cases raising gay rights issues before the Supreme Court).
33. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
34. Id. at 190 (framing the issue as “whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy”). A straight couple, John and Mary
Doe, were a part of the original lawsuit against the Georgia statute, but they were dismissed
from the case for lack of standing. Id. at 188 n.2. Justice White thus wrote that “[t]he only
claim properly before the Court, therefore, is [Respondent’s] challenge to the Georgia statute
as applied to consensual homosexual sodomy.” Id.
35. Id. at 190–91 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388
U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
36. Id. at 191.
37. See id.
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With no precedent applying to the right at issue, the majority
then considered whether it could announce a new protected fundamental right. According to Justice White, new rights are protected
when they are “‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that
neither liberty nor justice would exist if [they] were sacrificed” or
if they are “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” 38
Having already framed the right at issue as the right of gay people
to engage in sodomy (as opposed to a more general right of sexual
privacy or autonomy for all), Justice White easily concluded that
this narrowly framed right met neither test, derisively calling the
arguments advanced in favor of finding a new protected right “at
best, facetious.” 39
B. The Four Cases That Expanded Constitutional Protection
Ten years later, the Court began its journey to transform gay
rights under the Constitution. With the addition of Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, the Court took a new look at
gay rights beginning with Romer v. Evans, the 1996 case that
struck down Colorado’s Amendment 2. 40 That state constitutional
provision, adopted by the voters in a statewide referendum, had
two components. First, it repealed municipal antidiscrimination
provisions that protected people from being discriminated against
based on sexual orientation. 41 Second, it prohibited any future
state or local action that protected against discrimination based on
sexual orientation. 42
In a 6–3 decision striking down Amendment 2, Justice Kennedy
wrote the first of his four majority opinions expanding constitutional protection for gay rights. He began his opinion by reviewing
the importance of antidiscrimination laws throughout history, including the more recent move to include sexual orientation as a
protected class. 43 Justice Kennedy then explained precisely how
much damage Amendment 2 would do to Colorado’s gay residents,
38. Id. at 191–92 (first quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937); then
quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (alteration in original)).
39. Id. at 192–94.
40. 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996).
41. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, quoted in Romer, 517 U.S. at 623–24. Several cities in
Colorado had such ordinances, including Denver, Aspen, and Boulder. Romer, 517 U.S. at
623–24.
42. COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, quoted in Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
43. Romer, 517 U.S. at 627–29.
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both in terms of prohibiting legislation protecting them, as well as
preventing judges and other officials from using generally applicable laws to protect them. 44 He summarized the amendment’s effect
by saying that it “imposes a special disability” upon gay people, one
that will impact “an almost limitless number of transactions and
endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society.” 45
From there, Justice Kennedy quickly concluded that Amendment 2 violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause. He framed the issue as one raising neither a fundamental
right nor implicating a protected class, thus subject only to rational
basis review. 46 That level of review, which usually allows states
almost limitless leeway in crafting a law, 47 has two limiting principles that Justice Kennedy found determinative in Romer. First,
by singling out gay people from seeking protection from the government, Justice Kennedy said that the law denied equal protection “in the most literal sense.” 48 Second, the law’s broad impact on
gay people indicated, to Justice Kennedy, that the only possible explanation for enacting it was “animosity toward the class of persons affected,” a justification that is not permitted under equal protection doctrine, even in the application of rational basis review. 49
Justice Kennedy rejected Colorado’s argument that it had several
legitimate bases for the law, such as conserving resources and respecting the freedom of association of its citizens. 50 Rather, to Justice Kennedy, the amendment’s breadth indicated that the real
reason behind it was hatred of a disfavored group, something the
Constitution rejects. 51
Romer was celebrated as a huge victory for LGBT rights, as it
was the first of its kind in the history of the Supreme Court. But it

44. Id. at 629–31.
45. Id. at 631.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 592–93 (1979) (allowing a
law under rational basis review despite vast overinclusiveness); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (allowing a law under rational basis review despite vast
underinclusiveness).
48. Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. Justice Kennedy explained that “[c]entral both to the idea
of the rule of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection is the principle
that government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its
assistance.” Id.
49. Id. at 634–35 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
50. Id. at 635.
51. Id.
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did not displace the black mark of Bowers, with the majority opinion never even mentioning the case. Bowers remained good law for
another seven years, until the Court decided Lawrence v. Texas. 52
Lawrence, like Bowers, challenged a state law banning sodomy, but
this time, unlike in Bowers, the law specifically singled out samesex sexual activity. 53
Although the law was challenged under both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Kennedy’s decision for the Court rested only upon
due process. 54 Disagreeing with the holding in Bowers, Justice
Kennedy wrote that there is protection under the Due Process
Clause beyond the confines of the marital relationship. 55 For gay
people, the prohibition on sodomy does not impact marriage (there
was no same-sex marriage in the United States at the time of Lawrence), but it does touch “upon the most private human conduct,
sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.” 56
This behavior is within the context of “a personal relationship” that
Justice Kennedy said was “within the liberty of persons to choose
without being punished as criminals.” 57
Justice Kennedy’s opinion then proceeded to review the history
of laws regulating gay sexuality and its relevance to the case. After
surveying the history of law and morality, Justice Kennedy concluded that it was more important to take note of the “emerging
awareness” in the country that gay people were entitled to make
decisions about how to conduct their own personal lives. 58 Because
of this different focus, as well as the intervening decision in
Romer, 59 Justice Kennedy famously stated that “Bowers was not
52. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). For the definitive history of Lawrence, see DALE
CARPENTER, FLAGRANT CONDUCT: THE STORY OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS (2012).
53. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562–63, 566 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.06(a),
21.01(1) (West 2011)).
54. Id. at 564. “Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause
some might question whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between same-sex and different-sex participants.” Id. at 575.
55. Id. at 564–66 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
56. Id. at 567.
57. Id. (“The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right
to make this choice.”).
58. Id. at 567–72. Justice Kennedy concluded, “In all events we think that our laws and
traditions in the past half century are of most relevance here. These references show an
emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding
how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.” Id. at 571–72.
59. Justice Kennedy also pointed to Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v.
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correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It . . . should
be and now is overruled.” 60 Having cast aside Bowers and framed
sexual autonomy for gay people as a protected liberty interest, Justice Kennedy struck down the law as a violation of the Due Process
Clause, concluding that the statute was not supported by a legitimate state interest that “can justify its intrusion into the personal
and private life of the individual.” 61
With Romer and Lawrence under his belt and Bowers overruled,
Justice Kennedy’s next two LGBT rights decisions came in the context of same-sex marriage. The first, United States v. Windsor,
struck down the federal Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) as unconstitutional. 62 Passed in 1996, DOMA gave states permission not
to recognize same-sex marriages from other states and defined
marriage (and related terms) under federal law as between a man
and a woman. 63 In Windsor, two women were married in Ontario,
and resided in a state that recognized their marriage. 64 When one
of the women died, she left her entire estate to her wife. 65 The
widow then sued to challenge the second part of DOMA, because
that provision meant the transfer of assets would be taxable under
federal law as a gift from a stranger rather than from a spouse. 66
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion found that this section of
DOMA violated the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. 67
In many ways, the majority opinion tracked the reasoning of
Romer. After dispensing with the complex standing issue before
the Court 68 and explaining the federalism interests that states
have in regulating marriage, 69 Justice Kennedy turned to an as-

Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and its reaffirmation of substantive due process protection for
“personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing, and education.” Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573–74.
60. Id. at 578.
61. Id.
62. 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013).
63. Id. at 752 (reviewing Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419
(1996) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7; 28 U.S.C. § 1738C)).
64. See id. at 753.
65. Id.
66. See id.
67. Technically, the law ran afoul of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Id. at 774 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500
(1954)).
68. Id. at 755–63.
69. Id. at 763–69.
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sessment of the ways that the federal law harmed same-sex couples who were lawfully married under state law. Like his analysis
of Amendment 2 in Romer, Justice Kennedy found that DOMA had
“great reach” in how unequal it made same-sex couples who were
married under state law. 70 The effects of DOMA spanned the areas
of family law, bankruptcy, healthcare benefits, taxes, death, criminal law, children’s rights, educational financial aid, and ethics. 71
Along with this broad harmful effect, according to the Court majority, was a purpose to harm same-sex couples. Justice Kennedy
identified several reasons why the law’s intent was harmful, starting with the congressional debates and the very name of the law. 72
Based on this analysis, he concluded that the law’s purpose was to
ensure that same-sex marriages were “treated as second-class
marriages for purposes of federal law.” 73 Relying on the same body
of law as in Romer (as well as Romer itself in a parenthetical), 74
Justice Kennedy concluded that DOMA was unconstitutional because of its purpose to injure a particular group and its broad effect
in doing so. 75
Windsor struck down DOMA, but did not address state bans on
same-sex marriage. 76 The Court tackled that issue two years later
in the last case in this series of Justice Kennedy-authored opinions
advancing gay rights. In Obergefell v. Hodges, four states’ bans on
same-sex marriage—Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and Tennessee—
were before the Court, challenged by fourteen same-sex couples
and two men whose partners were deceased. 77 Unlike the prior
three cases decided on the basis of either equal protection or due
process, Obergefell struck down the laws under both doctrines. 78

70. Id. at 772.
71. See id. at 772–74.
72. Id. at 770–71.
73. Id. at 771.
74. Id. at 770–71 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973)).
75. Id. at 775 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the
purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws,
sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”).
76. See id.
77. 576 U.S. __, __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2593 (2015).
78. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2604 (“These considerations lead to the conclusion that the
right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the
same-sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty.”).
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The Court’s opinion struck down the laws by looking at the nature of the fundamental right to marry. Long-recognized within the
doctrine of substantive due process, the fundamental right to
marry had never previously been articulated as including samesex couples. 79 Here, Justice Kennedy extrapolated from past cases
and said that the four principles that justify treating marriage as
a fundamental right apply equally to same-sex marriages. 80 These
four principles—that marriage promotes individual autonomy and
choice; is a union unlike any other for committed relationships;
protects children and families; and is central to civil society—are
just as true of same-sex marriages as those between a man and a
woman. 81
As in the other cases, Justice Kennedy then turned to the harm
that bans on same-sex marriage impose. Not only do these bans
deny same-sex couples the material benefits discussed in Windsor,
Justice Kennedy explained, they also create instability in the couples’ lives, send a message of inequality, and demean their existence. 82 Both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause are expansive enough to recognize this harm and to accommodate a broader understanding of marriage than may have existed previously. 83 In a combined analysis of both doctrines, Justice
Kennedy concluded:
It is now clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty of samesex couples, and it must be further acknowledged that they abridge
central precepts of equality. Here the marriage laws enforced by the
respondents are in essence unequal: same-sex couples are denied all
the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples and are barred from exercising a fundamental right. Especially against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this denial to same-sex couples of the
right to marry works a grave and continuing harm. The imposition of
this disability on gays and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them. And the Equal Protection Clause, like the Due Process
Clause, prohibits this unjustified infringement of the fundamental
right to marry. 84

79. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2598 (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987); Zablocki
v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)).
80. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
81. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2599–601.
82. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2601–02.
83. See id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–04.
84. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.
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Because of this infringement, Justice Kennedy’s opinion struck
down all state same-sex marriage bans as invalid. 85
C. The Three Cases Indirectly Addressing Constitutional Gay
Rights
During the same time period that the Supreme Court was expanding gay rights under the Constitution, it also had to grapple
with three cases that each raised essentially the same question:
does the Constitution prohibit states from applying antidiscrimination law to people or entities that object to gay rights? The first
of these cases, Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual
Group of Boston, presented this issue in the context of Boston’s St.
Patrick’s Day Parade. 86 The private individuals who organized the
parade did not want an Irish gay rights group to participate in the
parade. 87 However, the state courts read the Massachusetts public
accommodations law, which prohibited discrimination based on
sexual orientation, to require the parade organizers to include the
group. 88
Before the United States Supreme Court, the parade organizers
argued that their First Amendment right to choose their own message was violated, and a unanimous Supreme Court agreed. In an
opinion written by Justice Souter, the Court determined that the
parade at issue was expressive and thus protected by the First
Amendment. 89 Justice Souter acknowledged the importance of antidiscrimination laws in public accommodations, 90 but concluded
that they could not force the parade organizers to include a message that they did not choose to include on their own. 91 Doing so
would violate the First Amendment’s protection against compelled
speech; thus, state law could not force the parade organizers to include the gay rights group. 92

85. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2605.
86. 515 U.S. 557, 560–61 (1995).
87. Id. at 561.
88. Id. at 561–65.
89. See id. at 568–70.
90. Id. at 571–72.
91. Id. at 572–75. Justice Souter noted that the parade organizers were not excluding
LGBT people from the parade, but rather only the message that the LGBT group wanted to
convey. Id. at 572.
92. Id. at 581.
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The next case raised very similar issues, this time in the context
of the Boy Scouts and a gay scoutmaster. In Boy Scouts of America
v. Dale, the Court reviewed the case of James Dale, an assistant
scoutmaster whose membership was revoked because a newspaper
wrote an article that mentioned he was gay. 93 New Jersey law prohibited discrimination in public accommodations based on sexual
orientation, and the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the Boy
Scouts of America constituted a public accommodation under state
law. 94 Thus, the Boy Scouts violated the law by kicking Dale out of
the organization on the basis of his sexuality. 95 The New Jersey
Supreme Court differentiated Hurley, explaining that the Boy
Scouts of America as an organization does not express any message, unlike the parade at issue in Hurley. 96
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote for a five-Justice majority that Hurley applies to
the case because the Boy Scouts of America does indeed have an
expressive message. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion reviewed
the Scout Oath and Scout Law and concluded that by instilling values in young boys, the Boy Scouts of America has an expressive
message. 97 Part of that message is disapproval of homosexuality,
something that being forced to allow Dale to continue as scoutmaster would compromise. 98 The fact that New Jersey believed discrimination against people based on their sexual orientation was a
grave enough problem that it should be addressed by state law was
not enough to “justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’
rights to freedom of expressive association.” 99 Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted that society’s attitudes about gay rights were
changing, but used that as further evidence that the Boy Scouts’
rights had been violated, stating that “the fact that an idea may be
embraced and advocated by increasing numbers of people is all the
more reason to protect the First Amendment rights of those who
wish to voice a different view.” 100

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

530 U.S. 640, 644–45 (2000).
Id. at 645–46.
Id. at 646.
Id. at 647.
Id. at 649–50.
Id. at 650–54.
Id. at 659.
Id. at 660.
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The final case in this trilogy once again ruled in favor of the person objecting to gay rights, although in a more limited manner. In
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, a devout Christian baker objected to creating a custom wedding cake
for a same-sex couple. 101 Colorado law includes sexual orientation
as a protected status under its public accommodations law, so the
state charged the baker with violating the law by refusing to bake
the custom cake. 102 The Colorado Civil Rights Commission and the
Colorado Court of Appeals ruled against the baker, finding that he
violated the law and that requiring him to bake the cake would not
infringe on his First Amendment religion or speech rights. 103
Before the United States Supreme Court, the baker asked the
Court to allow his religious objection to trump state antidiscrimination law, but the Court, in a 7–2 decision written by Justice Kennedy, ruled much more narrowly. Justice Kennedy’s opinion
walked a fine line, not only recognizing the importance of religious
objections to same-sex marriage, but also the value of generally applicable antidiscrimination laws that religion cannot trump. 104 In
fact, Justice Kennedy specifically extolled the value of antidiscrimination laws for gay people. He noted that society has advanced to
recognize that gay people “cannot be treated as social outcasts or
as inferior in dignity and worth” and warned of “community-wide
stigma” if broad exceptions were recognized for religious people in
antidiscrimination laws. 105
Instead of resolving this conflict of important principles, Justice
Kennedy’s opinion found fault in the way the Colorado agency decided the baker’s case. He explained that several different aspects
of the agency’s actions indicated that it was biased against religious individuals. 106 Because the baker did not get a neutral hearing free from religious bias at the agency level, Justice Kennedy
101. 584 U.S. __, __, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1724 (2018).
102. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1725–27.
103. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1726–27.
104. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1727. Compare “religious and philosophical objections to gay
marriage are protected views and in some instances protected forms of expression,” with “it
is a general rule that such objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the
economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under
a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law.” Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.
105. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.
106. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–31. Justice Kennedy pointed to one commissioner’s
comments about religion being an excuse for such things as slavery and the Holocaust as
well as the fact that the commission ruled in favor of three other bakers who denied service
to people who wanted antigay messages baked onto a cake for religious reasons. Id. at __,
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ruled that the baker’s First Amendment right to free exercise of
religion was violated and that he could not be forced to bake the
cake for the couple. 107
Justice Kennedy included an important caveat at the end of the
decision, one that is going to beguile lower courts until the overarching issue of the conflict between religion and antidiscrimination law is decided:
The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recognizing that
these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons
to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market. 108

In other words, Justice Kennedy is asking lower courts deciding
this issue in future cases to walk the tightrope of respecting each
side: respecting sincere religious beliefs and not subjecting gay people to indignities. 109
D. Making Sense of These Majority Opinions
As noted above, this series of cases has had very clear and important outcomes. As to the basic question of whether gay people
have rights under the Constitution, the Court has done an aboutface that has undoubtedly advanced the march toward equality.
After the rocky start of Bowers, the Court has issued four consecutive decisions finding that gay people are protected under the Con-

138 S. Ct. at 1729–30.
107. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
108. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
109. So far, lower courts have rejected claims from religious objectors in the wake of
Masterpiece Cakeshop. The Arizona Court of Appeals rejected the claim of a religious calligrapher, finding that local antidiscrimination law prevails when there is no religious bias in
its application. Brush & Nib Studio v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426, 431, 443 n.13, 444
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2018). Similarly, the highest courts of Oregon and Hawaii both refused to
hear cases from religious objectors that raised these issues in the wake of Masterpiece
Cakeshop, presumably because there was no religious bias in the application of the state
law in those cases, Hawai’i Supreme Court Declines to Hear Case of B&B That Denied Room
to Lesbian Couple, LAMBDA LEGAL (July 11, 2018), https://www.lambdalegal
.org/blog/20180711_hawaii-supreme-court-rejects-case-of-bnb [https://perma.cc/W5DY-TU
NP], and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Hawaii case in March,
Aloha Bed & Breakfast v. Cervelli, No. 18-451, 586 U.S. __, 2019 WL 1231949 (Mar. 18,
2019) (mem.). For now, it appears that Masterpiece Cakeshop is being read narrowly in this
regard. See Slockish v. U.S. Fed. Highway Admin., No. 3:08-CV-01169-YY, 2018 WL
4909902, at *2–3 (D. Or. Oct. 10, 2018); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F. Supp. 3d 661
(E.D. Pa. 2018).
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stitution. As a result of these decisions, states cannot ban antidiscrimination laws based on sexual orientation, criminalize same-sex
sexual activity, or ban same-sex marriage, and the federal government likewise cannot define marriage as between one man and one
woman.
These legal victories for the gay rights movement have had incredibly profound effects on American society. While the legal issue
in Romer was somewhat esoteric, it gave the Court’s imprimatur
to a movement that was just starting to change public opinion in
this country. Then, with Lawrence’s holding and its overruling of
Bowers, the Court removed the stigma of the possibility that states
could label core aspects of a gay person’s identity as criminal.
Windsor forced the federal government to recognize the growing
number of state-authorized same-sex marriages in the country,
and Obergefell allowed people nationwide to marry the person they
love regardless of sex. Separately and as a group, these decisions
moved the needle in significant ways on gay rights in this country. 110
But jurisprudentially, these decisions were somewhat of a mess.
Most prominently, in each of the cases, advocates on both sides
briefed the issue of whether sexual orientation is entitled to any
form of heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
Yet, in both Romer and Windsor, the two cases that relied exclusively on principles of equality to strike down discriminatory laws,
Justice Kennedy’s opinion avoided the question altogether.
Instead of finding that sexual orientation is a suspect or quasisuspect class, or even rejecting these claims, Justice Kennedy
based both decisions on the principle that if a law is based on animus toward a disfavored group, it fails equal protection rational

110. Leonore F. Carpenter, The Next Phase: Positioning the Post-Obergefell LGBT Rights
Movement to Bridge the Gap Between Formal and Lived Equality, 13 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L.
255, 265 (2017) (“What Obergefell represents, both to lay people and movement lawyers, is
the happy ending to a very long, very exhausting chapter in LGBT history—a chapter that
has to a great degree shaped the way in which the movement is constructed, how its successes are measured, and indeed, how society thinks about LGBT people.”).
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basis review. 111 Rational basis review for animus-based laws, established in United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno 112
and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 113 has been criticized for many reasons. 114 One such criticism is that, under the
guise of rational basis review, the Court is looking behind the government’s justifications for a law—something it does not ordinarily
do at this level of equal protection scrutiny—and labeling otherwise legitimate reasons as hatred or animus. 115
For instance, in Romer, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that the
state proffered otherwise legitimate reasons for Amendment 2:
freedom of association, as well as conserving resources. 116 However, because of the broad scope of Amendment 2’s impact and the
state’s rationales being “far removed” from this scope, Justice Kennedy said that “we find it impossible to credit [these justifications].” 117 Likewise, in Windsor, Congress justified DOMA on the
basis of tradition and morality, justifications that would otherwise
satisfy rational basis review. 118 But under the animus line of cases,
Justice Kennedy rejected those justifications and instead found the
law’s rejection of state marriages and the far-reaching effects that
rejection would bring about to be “strong evidence of a law having
the purpose and effect of disapproval of that class.” 119
Critics contend that the Court is not applying real rational basis
review, but instead something akin to “rational basis plus” or “rational basis with bite.” 120 The Court applied this slightly heightened level of scrutiny without providing any clarity as to why it
111. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 769–70, 774–75 (2013) (“[DOMA] is invalid,
for no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those
whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”); Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996) (“[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable
inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons
affected.”).
112. 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973).
113. 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).
114. WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS: A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO BIAS IN THE LAW 73–75
(2017) (discussing criticisms of the animus doctrine); Daniel O. Conkle, Animus and Its Alternatives: Constitutional Principle and Judicial Prudence, 48 STETSON L. REV. 195, 198
(forthcoming 2019) (criticizing the doctrine as being constitutionally sound but unworkable
in application and raising difficult issues of judicial statesmanship).
115. See Conkle, supra note 114, at 204–05.
116. 517 U.S. at 635.
117. Id.
118. 570 U.S. 744, 770–71 (2013).
119. Id. at 770.
120. See Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Note, Reconciling Rational-Basis Review: When
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rejected truly heightened scrutiny and without offering a principled explanation of when the Court will look behind the state’s
proffered reasons for a law. 121 Basing the key gay rights cases of
Romer and Windsor on this doctrine gives lower courts less-thanclear guidance about how to address sexual orientation under the
Equal Protection Clause in future cases. 122
Moreover, by repeatedly ignoring the notion that sexual orientation claims under the Equal Protection Clause should be analyzed
under a form of heightened or strict scrutiny, Justice Kennedy implicitly conveyed the message that discrimination based on sexual
orientation is not a serious constitutional concern. True, the forms
of discrimination in each of these cases were constitutionally problematic; but as a general matter, Justice Kennedy could not bring
himself to condemn sexual orientation discrimination. The Supreme Court has, on the other hand, clearly analyzed discrimination based on race, national origin, and sex under a heightened
form of scrutiny. But in the important gay rights cases, the Court
has flatly avoided the issue. One or two times might be an excusable oversight, but four times gives the impression that the Court
does not think the issue is serious enough to warrant even a cursory explanation.
With respect to the Due Process Clause, the Court’s gay rights
decisions have produced a similar lack of clarity. Both Lawrence

Does Rational Basis Bite?, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2070, 2072 (2015).
121. This lack of explanation was apparent in Trump v. Hawaii when the majority and
dissent sparred over labeling President Trump’s justifications for his travel ban as based on
hatred. 585 U.S. __, __, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2418, 2433 (2018). The majority cited this line of
cases—that laws will be struck down under rational basis review when the “laws at issue
lack any purpose other than a ‘bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group’”—but
did not think that the circumstances fit and instead accepted the administration’s “national
security” justification. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 2420–21. The dissent cited the same line of
cases to find that the justification for the travel ban was nothing more than President
Trump’s “express hostility toward Muslims.” Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 2441–42 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
122. See Kate Girard, Note, The Irrational Legacy of Romer v. Evans: A Decade of Judicial Review Reveals the Need for Heightened Scrutiny of Legislation That Denies Equal Protection to Members of the Gay Community, 36 N.M. L. REV. 565, 565–66 (2006) (“[L]ower
courts consistently cite Romer as the decision in which the U.S. Supreme Court decided not
to classify members of the gay community as a suspect group or protected class. As a result,
a decade of lower court precedent cites Romer for the rule that law that classifies on the
basis of sexual orientation is presumed valid so long as the statute is rationally related to
any legitimate state interest.”); see also Tobin A. Sparling, The Odd Couple: How Justices
Kennedy and Scalia, Together, Advanced Gay Rights in Romer v. Evans, 67 MERCER L. REV.
305, 306 (2017) (arguing that Justice Kennedy’s unfocused analysis “relegated gay rights to
the sideline”).
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and Obergefell were decided on the basis of substantive due process, but neither is easy to fit within the Court’s jurisprudence in
the area. In both, advocates attempted to persuade the Court that
the fundamental right of sexual and romantic autonomy was at
stake. 123 However, in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy danced around
the issue of a fundamental right. After reviewing the series of cases
that found fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause, Justice Kennedy’s opinion never returned to that point. 124 Instead, he
discussed Bowers at length before eventually overturning it. 125
Once that was accomplished, Justice Kennedy muddied the waters of rights framing under the Due Process Clause. Instead of
talking about “fundamental rights” that are analyzed under strict
scrutiny, he called the right at issue in the case simply the “right
to liberty.” 126 Past cases that used a similar formulation contrasted
the generic interest in liberty with specific fundamental rights, analyzing the former under rational basis and the latter under strict
scrutiny. 127 Justice Kennedy’s opinion did neither. He did not say
he was applying strict scrutiny or anything like it, but he also rejected Texas’s stated interest in morality. He concluded that there
was “no legitimate state interest which can justify [the law’s] intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.” 128
What is this “right to liberty” that Justice Kennedy protected in
Lawrence? He was characteristically grandiose yet vague about it:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships
where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public
conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government
must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and
mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common
to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for
their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control
their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. 129

123. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015); Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
124. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
125. See id. at 566–78 (“Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”).
126. Id. at 578.
127. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719–21 (1997).
128. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
129. Id.
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As a result of this “artful ambiguity,” 130 lower courts have been
confused about how to apply Lawrence, 131 and critics, even those
who agree with the outcome in the case, have had many bases upon
which to deride the decision. 132
Obergefell took this confusion one step further. Justice Kennedy’s opinion in this case was much more clearly about a fundamental right, given that much of his reasoning relied on the wellestablished precedent that frames the right to marry as fundamental. 133 However, in analyzing whether the state bans on same-sex
marriage fell under this framework, not once did he mention strict
scrutiny, the traditional test for analyzing fundamental rights.
Moreover, instead of analyzing due process or equal protection,
Justice Kennedy applied a hybrid analysis, melding the two to
strike down the state laws. Again, using the lofty language he is
known for, he explained:
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection
may rest on different precepts and are not always co-extensive, yet in
some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach
of the other. In any particular case one Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and comprehensive
way, even as the two Clauses may converge in the identification and
definition of the right. 134

This hybrid analysis meant the end of same-sex marriage bans.
These laws “burden the liberty of same-sex couples,” while also

130. Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig: Regulating Women’s Sexuality, 56
EMORY L.J. 1235, 1272 (2007).
131. See Eric Berger, Lawrence’s Stealth Constitutionalism and Same-Sex Marriage Litigation, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 806 n.284 (discussing Williams v. Attorney General
of Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232, 1233, 1236–38 (11th Cir. 2004), which upheld Alabama’s law
prohibiting the sale of sex toys under Lawrence; and Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517
F.3d 738, 743–47 (5th Cir. 2008), which held Texas’ law prohibiting the sale of sex toys
unconstitutional under Lawrence).
132. See, e.g., id. at 767–68 (critiquing Lawrence for being “under-theorized” and relying
on “a broad level of generality” and “hybrid reasoning” while “declin[ing] to identify a level
of scrutiny”); Robert C. Farrell, Justice Kennedy’s Idiosyncratic Understanding of Equal
Protection and Due Process, and Its Costs, 32 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 439, 439 (2014) (analyzing
how Justice Kennedy’s opinion “ignored the longstanding framework of analysis that the
Court has established” for both the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clause).
133. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2591, 2598 (2015).
134. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2602–03.
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“abridg[ing] central precepts of equality.” 135 The opinion nodded towards the language of suspect class status, noting a long history of
discrimination subordinating gay and lesbian individuals. 136 But,
there was once again no clarity about what level of scrutiny to apply 137 or how to analyze constitutional issues around sexual orientation when only a liberty claim or only an equality claim is presented to the Court. In other words, like the gay rights cases that
preceded it, Obergefell clearly answered the question presented to
the Court, but did so in a way that will sow confusion in the future. 138
Only one of the cases addressing the clash between gay rights
and the First Amendment raised the same concern. Both Dale and
Hurley gave clear answers to this clash: in the context of antidiscrimination law applied to an entity with an expressive message, antidiscrimination law must give way to the entity’s First
Amendment speech rights. 139 The challenge in these cases is determining whether an entity has an expressive message that is entitled to First Amendment protection. This determination is a difficult one, but that difficulty has nothing to do with the issue of gay
rights; the Court has struggled with this determination in every
other context in which it has arisen. 140
The clash between gay rights and the First Amendment in Masterpiece Cakeshop was different. Justice Kennedy’s decision in that
case left unanswered the question of whether the baker was protected under the First Amendment’s free speech clause. 141 Instead,
135. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.
136. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2604.
137. Susan Frelich Appleton accuses the Court of “abandon[ing] . . . tiers of scrutiny in
the LGBTQ cases.” Susan Frelich Appleton, Obergefell’s Liberties: All in the Family, 77
OHIO ST. L.J. 919, 957–58 (2016) (footnote omitted).
138. See Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 147, 148, 179 (2015) (trying to explain the promise of Obergefell, but concluding that
“[d]iscerning new liberties has always been, and will always be, more an art than a science,”
and that [a]fter Obergefell, it is simply much more openly an art”); see also Appleton, supra
note 137, at 977 (applauding the Obergefell ruling but calling it “problematic” and missing
“a more focused and coherent analysis” that engendered “confusion”).
139. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 572–73 (1995).
140. See, e.g., Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984) (distinguishing between the constitutional protections for “freedom of intimate association” and “freedom of
expressive association”).
141. Justice Kennedy noted that the “free speech aspect of this case is difficult, for few
persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought of its creation as an
exercise of protected speech.” Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 584
U.S. __, __, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723 (2018). After noting this difficulty, he did not return to
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he decided the case on the basis of religious neutrality, finding that
the Colorado agency charged with administering the antidiscrimination law was infused with religious bias when it heard the
case. 142 Thus, it is clear from Masterpiece Cakeshop that agency
determinations regarding religious objectors to generally applicable laws must be neutral with respect to religion. Moreover, the
Court’s analysis of the problems with the agency determination indicated that it will not give such agencies much leeway in how they
discuss religion, as Justice Kennedy reached his conclusion with
less than extensive proof that religious bias was at work. 143
But what is not at all clear from Masterpiece Cakeshop is what
to do in the case of a religious objector to an antidiscrimination law
when the agency makes its determination free from religious bias.
Justice Kennedy noted that future cases are going to have to resolve that issue, and the matter “await[s] further elaboration in
the courts.” 144 These future courts are going to find plenty to work
with in Justice Kennedy’s opinion; however, nothing from the opinion will resolve the issue, as Justice Kennedy spoke favorably of
the rights on both sides.
As noted above, his opinion praised antidiscrimination laws that
protect against sexual orientation discrimination, noting their importance to gay people’s “dignity and worth.” 145 Thus, he noted that
“it is a general rule that [religious] objections do not allow business
owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral
and generally applicable public accommodations law.” 146 He also
concluded the opinion by stating that future disputes have to be
resolved “without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they
seek goods and services in an open market.” 147 Lawyers for gay
address the issue, instead deciding the case on religious neutrality principles. Id. at __, 138
S. Ct. at 1724. Justice Thomas’s separate concurrence, discussed in depth infra Part III,
addresses the free speech issue.
142. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U.S. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1724.
143. See id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1729–31 (noting a small number of comments about religion and three separate determinations in cases posing related, but different, issues).
144. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
145. See id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.
146. Id. (citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 n.5 (1968) (per
curiam)). Justice Kennedy also wrote that Supreme Court “precedents make clear that the
baker, in his capacity as the owner of a business serving the public, might have his right to
the free exercise of religion limited by generally applicable laws.” Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at
1723–24.
147. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
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couples challenging religious objections to providing them services
will include this language in bold when they brief agencies and
courts on the issue.
However, when they make their case, lawyers for religious objectors will also have plenty to highlight from Justice Kennedy’s
opinion. The opinion talks about religious objections as “protected
views” that are “in some instances protected forms of expression.” 148 Justice Kennedy wrote sympathetically about the baker’s
predicament in drawing a line between the customer’s right to service and the baker’s own right to disagree with the message he believed the cake would convey. 149 And in the same sentence in which
he said that future decisions must not subject gay people to indignities, he called on future decision makers to resolve matters “with
tolerance, [and] without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs.” 150
Thus, the gift of Justice Kennedy’s Rorschach opinion is that future courts will be able to choose from language that supports
whichever outcome they want. This has already come to pass in the
lower courts. Despite the baker’s victory before the Supreme Court,
an appellate court in Arizona used Masterpiece Cakeshop to require
a calligrapher with religious objections to same-sex marriage to
create invitations for a same-sex couple. 151 In that case, the court
found that, unlike in Masterpiece Cakeshop, there was no religious
bias in the application of the law. 152 The court then referenced the
language from Masterpiece Cakeshop about the importance of antidiscrimination law and how religious objections cannot create
loopholes in such laws. 153
In other words, the Arizona court chose the language that Justice Kennedy included that favored antidiscrimination law and
ruled for the same-sex couple. Although there have not yet been
any cases post-Masterpiece Cakeshop that have ruled in favor of a
religious objector, it is easy to see how this could happen. All a
148. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1727.
149. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1728 (“Phillips’ dilemma was particularly understandable . . . .”).
150. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
151. Brush & Nib Studio v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426, 431–32, 438 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2018).
152. Id. at 443 n.13 (citing Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U.S. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1731–32).
153. Id. at 434 (quoting Masterpiece Cakeshop’s paragraph about the “dignity and worth”
of gay people, 584 U.S. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1727).
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court would have to do is emphasize the case’s other language
about the difficult position religious objectors find themselves in,
rather than the language highlighted in the Arizona case. That is
because, as much as Justice Kennedy’s opinion was clear that religious bias cannot form a part of a state determination, the opinion
was vague and unclear about how to resolve the dispute between
religion and antidiscrimination law that will repeatedly arise going forward.
II. SEPARATE OPINIONS IN THE GAY RIGHTS CASES
While the Supreme Court’s gay rights cases have profoundly
changed American life in many ways, the majority opinions have
left many unanswered questions in the wake of the Court’s vague
language and doctrinal analysis, all of it from Justice Anthony
Kennedy. The concurring and dissenting opinions in these cases
have addressed these flaws, as well as many other major gay rights
issues.
However, these separate opinions have been almost exclusively
from the conservative wing of the Court. Conservatives have
mocked gay rights, mocked their colleagues, attacked doctrinal
opacity, battled over how lower courts should respond, and predicted the end of traditional morality and religious freedom. In response, liberals have been virtually silent.
A. From Justice Kennedy’s Right
In almost every gay rights case before the Court, conservative
Justices have written separately to drive home their positions
against recognition or expansion of gay rights. This trend began
with Chief Justice Burger in Bowers. Even though the Court found
there was no fundamental right involved in the case, Chief Justice
Burger wrote separately to emphasize the point and explain that
laws penalizing gay sex have “ancient roots.” 154 He explained this
point by recounting ancient Judeo-Christian ethics, Roman law,
Blackstone, and the common law of England to prove that, in his
view, “millennia of moral teaching” have opposed “the act of homosexual sodomy.” 155
154.
155.

Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 196–97.
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Picking up from Chief Justice Burger’s inauspicious start, Justice Scalia has since dissented in every single case directly raising
the issue of gay rights and used those dissents as a platform for
writing antigay broadsides into the United States Reports. In
Romer, he did not mince words, repeatedly accusing Justice Kennedy and the majority of siding with the “elite class” in a culture
war that the Court has no business joining. 156 In the process, he
painted a picture of warring factions, portraying the case as a battle between the time-honored views of sexual morality held by the
“traditional forces” within Colorado and the views of those who
want to change common understandings of “reprehensible” behaviors that are, like being gay, appropriate for “moral disapproval”:
murder, polygamy, and cruelty to animals. 157 His opinion also demonized what he saw as the outsized influence of gay rights activists who “possess political power much greater than their numbers.” 158
Justice Scalia’s other dissents continued this same disparaging
line of argument. In Lawrence, he lamented that the Court “signed
on to the so-called homosexual agenda” 159 and he sympathized with
Americans who “do not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business, as scoutmasters for
their children, as teachers in their children’s schools, or as boarders in their home.” 160 In Windsor, he excused the language of “Defense of Marriage” as nothing more than respecting “an aspect of
marriage that had been . . . unquestioned in virtually all societies
for virtually all of human history.” 161

156. “This Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the resolution favored by
the elite class from which the Members of this institution are selected, pronouncing that
‘animosity’ toward homosexuality is evil.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (citation omitted). He started the opinion saying that the “Court has mistaken
a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.” Id.; see also id. at 652 (“When the Court takes sides in the
culture wars, it tends to be with the knights rather than the villeins—and more specifically
with the Templars, reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which the
Court’s Members are drawn.”).
157. Id. at 644–53. Justice Scalia similarly invoked the slippery slope in his Lawrence
dissent. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“State laws
against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation
of laws based on moral choices.”).
158. Romer, 517 U.S. at 645–46 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160. Id.
161. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 797–98 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

COHEN AC 534 APR 23 EDITS (DO NOT DELETE)

5/15/2019 1:19 PM

1114

[Vol. 53:1085

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

By the time Obergefell rolled around, Justice Scalia had apparently used up all of his disparaging comments for gay rights, so he
changed his target to his colleagues. He called Justice Kennedy’s
opinion “pretentious,” “egotistic,” and akin to “the mystical aphorisms of the fortune cookie,” and said that each Justice who signed
onto Justice Kennedy’s imprecise language should “hide [their]
head in a bag.” 162 Chief Justice Roberts joined this effort, as he expressed shock at his colleagues who had transformed “a social institution that has formed the basis of human society for millennia,
for the Kalahari Bushmen and the Han Chinese, the Carthaginians and the Aztecs. Just who do we think we are?” 163 He then concluded by chastising the majority for a decision that “had nothing
to do with” the Constitution. 164
Beyond mocking gay rights and fellow Justices, the conservative
dissents also derided the doctrinal confusion within the majority
opinions in these cases. In both his Romer and Windsor dissents,
Justice Scalia claimed that the equal protection analysis was unprecedented and indefensible. 165 In Romer, because Bowers was
still good law, he questioned how the Equal Protection Clause
could prohibit a state from discriminating against a class of people
that the Court at that specific point in time (post-Bowers and preLawrence) allowed to be criminalized. 166 And in Windsor, he accused the majority of mixing up equal protection and due process
principles in an impossible-to-discern way. 167 Moreover, he claimed
that the majority ignored the central question in the case as briefed
by the parties—whether laws restricting marriage to a man and a
woman are subject to heightened scrutiny—and instead applied an
unrecognizable form of rational basis review. 168 Justice Alito added
162. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2630 & n.22 (2015) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
163. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2612 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
164. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2626.
165. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 793 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[I]f this is meant to be an equalprotection opinion, it is a confusing one. The opinion does not resolve and indeed does not
even mention what had been the central question in this litigation: whether, under the
Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a woman are reviewed for
more than mere rationality.”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 639 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The world has never heard of such a principle, which is why the Court’s opinion is so
long on emotive utterance and so short on relevant legal citation.”).
166. Romer, 517 U.S. at 640–43.
167. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 792 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (exclaiming about the majority’s
conflation of the two doctrines, at one point, “what can that mean?”).
168. Id. at 793–94 (“But the Court certainly does not apply anything that resembles that
deferential framework.”).
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to Justice Scalia’s doctrinal critique in his own Windsor dissent.
He reviewed the standard three categories of review under equal
protection analysis—strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and rational basis review—and then puzzled over where the majority’s
analysis fit within this framework. 169 Similarly, Chief Justice Roberts’ separate dissent in Obergefell pulled no punches about the
majority’s equal protection analysis in the case, calling it “quite
frankly, difficult to follow.” 170
The conservatives had similar critiques of the due process analysis in Lawrence and Obergefell. In Lawrence in particular, Justice
Scalia argued that the majority’s due process analysis was not anchored to any previous doctrinal framework; according to Justice
Scalia, without calling the right at issue fundamental or saying
that strict scrutiny applied, the majority should have applied rational basis review and approved the law. 171 Instead, the majority
looked to emerging trends about sexual orientation, something
Justice Scalia said is not appropriate in substantive due process
analysis, which should be focused on tradition. 172 In Obergefell, he
aimed his doctrinal criticism at the majority’s view of the Fourteenth Amendment from the perspective of originalism. In Justice
Scalia’s understanding, because no one doubted that laws limiting
marriage to one man and one woman were constitutional at the
time of ratification, the Fourteenth Amendment leaves this determination to the people to change, not to the Justices. 173 Chief Justice Roberts’ Obergefell dissent was even more critical of the due
process analysis, likening the majority’s analysis to two of the
Court’s most infamous decisions: Dred Scott and Lochner. 174
In Windsor in particular, the conservatives battled over how
lower courts should respond to the decision. With the issue of
whether state bans on same-sex marriage were now at risk given
the Court striking down the federal definition of marriage as one
man and one woman, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia presented two different visions. Chief Justice Roberts, saying that “it

169. Id. at 811–16 (Alito, J., dissenting).
170. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2623 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
171. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586, 594, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 597–98.
173. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2628 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. See id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2616–17 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citing Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)).
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is undeniable that [the majority’s] judgment is based on federalism,” explained why the decision should be cabined to the federal
law and not have any relevance for state marriage bans. 175 Justice
Alito’s dissent similarly urged lower courts to focus on the federalism aspect of the decision. 176 In contrast, Justice Scalia recognized
the value in Chief Justice Roberts’ argument, but was so dismayed
by what he thought was sloppy reasoning from the majority that
he telegraphed in painstaking detail how lower courts could ignore
the federalism aspect of the decision and instead use its language
to strike down state same-sex marriage bans. 177
Finally, the conservative dissents are littered with parades of
horribles, portraying a future world without morality. In Romer,
Justice Scalia said that with the majority’s decision “polygamy
must be permitted.” 178 Chief Justice Roberts similarly lamented
the potential for acceptance of plural marriage in his Obergefell
dissent. 179 Justice Scalia went even further in Lawrence, claiming
that the Court’s decision likely spelled the end of “laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation,
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity.” 180 In Windsor, Justice Alito worried that the Court’s decision to strike down the federal definition of marriage would have long-term effects on marriage and the family structure. 181 To him, the “ancient and
universal” family structure of the past was threatened by this fundamental change, a shift about which no one can predict the consequences. 182 In his Obergefell dissent, Justice Alito feared that
same-sex marriage would increase the number of children born out
of wedlock and lead to “marriage’s further decay.” 183
175. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 777–78 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
176. See id. at 817 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“To the extent that the Court takes the position
that the question of same-sex marriage should be resolved primarily at the state level, I
wholeheartedly agree.”).
177. Id. at 799–800 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“How easy it is, indeed how inevitable, to
reach the same conclusion with regard to state laws denying same-sex couples marital status.”). Many lower courts accepted his invitation. See, e.g., Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp.
2d 542, 552 (W.D. Ky. 2014).
178. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
179. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2621–22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“It is
striking how much of the majority’s reasoning would apply with equal force to the claim of
a fundamental right to plural marriage.”).
180. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). He later
claimed that the decision “effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation.” Id. at 599.
181. 570 U.S. at 809–10 (Alito, J., dissenting).
182. Id.
183. 576 U.S. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2641–42 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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The conservative dissents also expressed concern that those who
believe in a traditional view of marriage will now be punished and
shamed. Chief Justice Roberts explained at length in Obergefell the
effect the decision will have on the “[m]any good and decent people
[who] oppose same-sex marriage as a tenet of faith.” 184 These “people of faith,” whom Chief Justice Roberts believes the majority labeled as “bigoted,” will now be forced by the government to act in
ways that violate their conscience, such as housing same-sex couples or losing tax-exempt status. 185 Justice Thomas’s dissent also
predicted “inevitable” conflict between the new government definition of marriage and the traditional religious definition of marriage, “particularly as individuals and churches are confronted
with demands to participate in and endorse civil marriages between same-sex couples.” 186 Justice Alito wrote about an even
darker future for marriage objectors. In his Obergefell dissent he
worried that they will be forced to “whisper their thoughts in the
recesses of their homes” out of a fear of being labeled and treated
as bigots in public. 187 Even worse, they may be subject to the same
discrimination and physical violence that gays and lesbians have
faced in the past because “some may think that turnabout is fair
play.” 188
In the three cases that present a clash between the First Amendment and antidiscrimination law, the separate opinions from conservative Justices highlight the fear at the heart of this last aspect

184. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2625 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
185. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2625–26.
186. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2638 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Interestingly, the rest of Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in Obergefell is the most level-headed response to the
changes in LGBT rights at the Court. He focuses much of his dissent on the different visions
of liberty at stake—the difference between “freedom from governmental action” as opposed
to “entitlement to governmental benefits.” Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2632, 2637 (endorsing a
strong view of the Due Process Clause that is about the right to be left alone rather than
any affirmative substantive right). Other than predicting problems in the clash between
religion and LGBT rights, he refrains from the over-the-top language that his conservative
colleagues used in their dissents in these cases. Emblematic of this approach is his dissent
in Lawrence, which is just two paragraphs long, asserting that the law at issue is “uncommonly silly” but not prohibited by the Constitution. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605–
06 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965)
(Stewart, J., dissenting)). However, in contrast to this more balanced approach, Justice
Thomas did join each of Justice Scalia’s dissents discussed here, as well as Chief Justice
Roberts’ dissent in Obergefell and Justice Alito’s dissents in Windsor and Obergefell. See
Obergefell, 576 U.S. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2611 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at __, 135 S. Ct.
at 2640 (Alito, J., dissenting); Windsor, 570 U.S. at 802 (Alito, J., dissenting).
187. 576 U.S. __, __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2642–43 (Alito, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2643.
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of the parade of horribles. No conservatives wrote separately in
Hurley or Dale, 189 but both Justice Gorsuch and Justice Thomas
wrote separate concurrences in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Justice Gorsuch wrote to emphasize the importance, in future cases, of scrupulously protecting the religious rights of those who object to samesex marriage. 190 Justice Thomas went even further, explaining
that the baker not only had free exercise rights at issue in the case,
but also free speech rights. 191 He concluded his analysis of the
baker’s free speech rights by reminding the reader of his warning
in Obergefell, urging future courts to ensure that dissent is not
stamped out and that freedom of thought is not vilified. 192
B. From the Middle
Compared to the large number of conservative separate opinions
on issues relating to gay rights at the Supreme Court, there have
been only two separate opinions from Justices in the middle of the
Court. This makes sense, as Justice Kennedy is generally regarded
as part of that middle, and he was the author of so many of the
majority opinions at issue here. It would be odd for Justices largely
in ideological agreement with him to write many separate opinions.
But there are two, both of which deserve some attention. Justice
Powell concurred in Bowers, agreeing with the Court on the fundamental rights issue. 193 He wrote separately to emphasize that he
would strike down any actual imprisonment of two individuals engaging in private, consensual sex because doing so would raise serious issues under the Eighth Amendment. 194 However, in this
case, there was no conviction, nor did the parties raise the Eighth
Amendment issue below. 195
189. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 642 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay,
Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995).
190. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U.S. __, __, 138 S.
Ct. 1719, 1737 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
191. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
192. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1748.
193. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring). Famously,
after he retired from the bench, Justice Powell stated that he regretted his vote in Bowers,
telling a group of students in 1990 that “I think I probably made a mistake in that one.”
Ruth Marcus, Powell Regrets Backing Sodomy Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1990, at A3.
194. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197–98.
195. Id. at 198.
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The only other separate opinion came from Justice O’Connor,
who concurred in the judgment in Lawrence. 196 Perhaps because
she was part of the majority in Bowers 197 and did not want to call
into question her vote in that case, she joined in the result in Lawrence but on equal protection grounds, not the due process grounds
that formed the basis of the majority opinion. 198 To Justice O’Connor, because the Texas law applied only to same-sex sexual behavior, it “makes homosexuals unequal in the eyes of the law.” 199 Applying the same rationale as in Romer, Justice O’Connor would
have applied rational basis review, striking the law down because
“moral disapproval, without any other asserted state interest, is
[not] a sufficient rationale.” 200
C. From Justice Kennedy’s Left
The liberal Justices have not been entirely silent in these cases,
but since Bowers, they have been almost completely absent from
the substantive debate about how the Constitution protects gay
rights. In fact, other than the dissents in Bowers and the dissent
in the denial of certiorari in Rowland that began this article, the
liberal Justices have not written one word in any of the cases that
directly address the issue of gay rights under the Constitution. Rather, they have saved their meager words on the issue for the cases
involving the clash between objectors and antidiscrimination law,
but even those words have been extremely limited.
In Bowers, both Justice Blackmun and Justice Stevens wrote
dissenting opinions, but only a small portion of Justice Stevens’s
opinion addressed the substantive issue of gay rights. Justice
Blackmun’s dissent developed a constitutional “right of intimate
association [that] does not depend in any way on [a person’s] sexual
orientation.” 201 He did not reach the equal protection issue or the
“controversial question whether homosexuals are a suspect
196. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 561 (2003).
197. 478 U.S. at 187.
198. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“I joined Bowers, and do not join the Court in overruling it.”).
199. Id. at 581.
200. Id. at 582–83. Justice Kennedy rejected this position in his majority opinion because
it would allow the legislature to then, on the face of the law, ban sodomy for everyone, while
knowing that it would have the greatest effect on same-sex sexual activity. Id. at 574–75
(majority opinion).
201. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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class.” 202 Undoubtedly, the right suggested by Justice Blackmun
would have advanced gay rights immensely, as it would have protected core sexual behavior, but his opinion did not ground this
protection in any notion of gay rights.
Justice Stevens’s Bowers dissent did reach that issue, but only
superficially. He first argued that the Constitution protects “the
right to engage in nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others may
consider offensive or immoral,” and that this right applies to everyone, regardless of sexual orientation. 203 Only after first engaging
in this analysis of a generalized sexual right did he explore
whether the state can apply this law selectively just to gay people. 204 He called this “plainly unacceptable,” and stated that “the
homosexual and the heterosexual have the same interest in deciding how he will live his own life, and, more narrowly, how he will
conduct himself in his personal and voluntary associations with his
companions. State intrusion into the private conduct of either is
equally burdensome.” 205 However, his analysis went no further
than this conclusory statement.
The remaining four liberal opinions in the gay rights cases all
appear in cases about the clash between objectors and antidiscrimination law, as the liberal Justices were completely silent in
Romer, Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell. 206 Hurley was unanimous with no separate opinions, 207 but Dale had dissents from Justice Stevens and Justice Souter. Justice Stevens’s opinion began by
explaining how the presence of a gay scoutmaster did not conflict
with any message the Boy Scouts of America have professed. 208 After addressing that issue at length, Justice Stevens talked more
generally about gay equality under the Constitution. In criticizing
the majority, he invoked the language of equal protection “suspect
classifications,” explaining that the majority adopted a view that

202. Id. at 202 n.2.
203. Id. at 216–18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. Id. at 218.
205. Id. at 218–19. Moreover, according to Justice Stevens, the state had no legitimate
interest in applying this law just to gay people, nor did it honestly advance such an interest
in this case. Id. at 219–20.
206. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
207. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995).
208. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. at 640, 665–98 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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“is tantamount to a constitutionally prescribed symbol of inferiority,” and referring to gay people as a “discrete group.” 209 He then
took note of the positive changes that had been taking place around
gay rights in the country:
Unfavorable opinions about homosexuals “have ancient roots.” Like
equally atavistic opinions about certain racial groups, those roots have
been nourished by sectarian doctrine. Over the years, however, interaction with real people, rather than mere adherence to traditional
ways of thinking about members of unfamiliar classes, have modified
those opinions. A few examples: The American Psychiatric Association’s and the American Psychological Association’s removal of “homosexuality” from their lists of mental disorders; a move toward greater
understanding within some religious communities; Justice
Blackmun’s classic opinion in Bowers; Georgia’s invalidation of the
statute upheld in Bowers; and New Jersey’s enactment of the provision at issue in this case. 210

Justice Stevens acknowledged the prevalence of prejudice and
the “serious and tangible harm to countless” people that this prejudice breeds. 211 He concluded by decrying the “constitutional
shield” the majority erected to protect these prejudices, and urged
instead that “the light of reason” guide the law and that “we must
let our minds be bold.” 212
As much as this opinion constituted an important recognition of
the discrimination faced by gay people, it did not expound upon a
theory of constitutional law that protects gay rights. Rather, it
hinted at the requirements of heightened scrutiny but went no further. Perhaps most notably, the other liberal Justices on the Court
at the time were part of a separate dissent from Justice Souter that
disclaimed the impact of this portion of Justice Stevens’s opinion.
Justice Souter wrote, “The fact that we are cognizant of this laudable decline in stereotypical thinking on homosexuality should not,
however, be taken to control the resolution of this case.” 213
The remaining two opinions from the left both appear in Masterpiece Cakeshop, but again, neither addressed the substantive issues of gay rights. Instead, Justice Kagan’s and Justice Ginsburg’s
separate opinions sparred over the future of cases of this type. Justice Kagan wrote a concurrence that, while agreeing with Justice
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 696, 698.
Id. at 699–700 (citations omitted).
Id. at 700.
Id.
Id. at 701 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Kennedy’s conclusion that there was religious bias in this case, 214
emphasized that future applications of state antidiscrimination
law can be applied in a nondiscriminatory way against religious
objectors. She clearly stated that “a vendor cannot escape a public
accommodations law because his religion disapproves of selling a
product to a group of customers, whether defined by sexual orientation, race, sex, or other protected trait.” 215 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent made the same point, but disagreed with Justice Kennedy’s
analysis of whether there was religious bias at the administrative
hearing. 216
Thus, while the liberals have occasionally written separately in
these cases, none has developed a reasoned argument for gay
rights under the Constitution. There have been glimmers of such
an argument, particularly in Justice Stevens’s dissent in Dale, but
that opinion fails to say anything other than basic characteristics
of the nature of antigay discrimination and that society is changing. 217 Even the dissents in Bowers, which squarely presented the
issue to the Court, 218 are nowhere near as developed as Justice
Brennan’s Rowland certiorari dissent that begins this article. That
opinion, now over three decades old and in the obscure position of
a dissent to a certiorari denial, continues to stand alone as the only
clear liberal statement of gay rights in the Court’s history.
III. WHAT THE LIBERALS COULD HAVE DONE
Despite the series of cases advancing constitutional protection
for gay rights, albeit tempered by the cases in which objectors’ First
Amendment claims prevailed over antidiscrimination norms, liberal Justices have been virtually silent about gay rights under the
Constitution. Instead, they have let Justice Kennedy speak alone
on the issue. As a result, the doctrine around LGBT 219 constitu-

214. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U.S. __, __, 138 S.
Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring).
215. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1733.
216. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1748–49.
217. See supra notes 203–06 and accompanying text.
218. See supra Part I.A.
219. As noted in supra note 8, in this article I differentiate between “gay rights” and
“LGBT rights.” Until now, I have been using “gay rights” because that has been what the
Supreme Court has addressed. Now that the article is talking about future issues and cases,
I will be using “LGBT rights” more, because these issues on the horizon are broader than
the issues the Court has addressed in the past.
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tional rights is murky at best, and key issues have been left unanswered. Moreover, there has been no response to extreme statements from over-the-top dissents.
The liberal Justices should have done more, and they could have
used the vehicle of the concurrence to do so. In the four cases addressing the substance of gay rights—Romer, Lawrence, Windsor,
and Obergefell—Justice Kennedy wrote for 6–3 (Romer and Lawrence) or 5–4 majorities (Windsor and Obergefell). 220 In any and all
of these cases, one or more of the liberal Justices could have written a concurring opinion addressing any number of issues related
to LGBT rights, and they could have done so without harming the
overall impact of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion.
A. Regular Versus Special Concurrences
At the simplest level, there are two types of concurrences: regular and special. 221 A regular concurrence is one in which the Justice
writing the concurrence joins the entirety of the majority—both the
opinion and the disposition—but writes separately about some aspect of the case. 222 This is in contrast to a special concurrence,
where the Justice agrees with the disposition the majority opinion
reached but not with the opinion. 223 With a special concurrence,
the Justice writes a separate opinion explaining the reasoning that
Justice believes is the correct way to reach the same outcome as
the majority. 224 The easiest way to tell the difference between the
two is how they are listed in the summary of the case and at the
start of the individual opinion. A regular concurrence is listed as a
“concurring opinion” while a special concurrence is listed as “concurring in the judgment.” 225
Two of the separate opinions discussed above highlight the difference. In Masterpiece Cakeshop, Justice Kagan wrote a regular
220. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2591 (2015); United States v.
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 747 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 561 (2003); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 621 (1996).
221. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 383–84 (1993).
222. See id.
223. See id.
224. See PAMELA C. CORLEY, CONCURRING OPINION WRITING ON THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT 5 (2010); Greg Goelzhauser, Silent Concurrences, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 351, 353–54
(2016) (explaining the difference between the two types of concurrences).
225. See CORLEY, supra note 224.
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concurrence, joining Justice Kennedy’s opinion in full but writing
separately to highlight her understanding of exactly how the Colorado Civil Rights Commission erred in considering the other cases
involving bakers and same-sex marriage. 226 This regular concurrence did not change the vote count in the case because she fully
agreed with the majority opinion, on both reasoning and result. 227
Contrast that opinion with Justice O’Connor’s special concurrence in Lawrence. In that opinion, she agreed with the result of
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, which struck down the Texas
law, but did not agree with the rationale, preferring to reach the
outcome under the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Due
Process Clause. 228 This opinion did not change the vote on the result in the case (6–3). However, it did change the vote on the legal
reasoning in the case. Because of Justice O’Connor’s special concurrence, the case is a 5–1–3 vote on legal reasoning, with five Justices believing the law violated the Due Process Clause (Justice
Kennedy’s opinion joined fully by the four liberal Justices), one
Justice believing it violated the Equal Protection Clause (Justice
O’Connor’s special concurrence for herself alone), and three Justices believing it violated neither (Justice Scalia’s dissent joined by
two others). 229
Special concurrences raise the potential for jurisprudential problems that regular concurrences do not. While Justice O’Connor’s
special concurrence in Lawrence did not change the fact that a majority of the Court voted to strike the law down under the Due Process Clause, if the vote had been 5–4 on the result of striking down
Texas’s law, a special concurrence would convert Justice Kennedy’s
opinion from a majority to a plurality. 230
Plurality opinions introduce confusion into the law that majority
opinions do not. Lower courts faced with a plurality opinion from
the Supreme Court must use the narrowest-grounds rule of Marks
v. United States to determine the holding of the Supreme Court:
226. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U.S. __, __, 138 S.
Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring).
227. Id.
228. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
229. Id. at 561 (majority opinion); id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment);
id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
230. See generally Justin F. Marceau, Lifting the Haze of Baze: Lethal Injection, the
Eighth Amendment, and Plurality Opinions, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 159, 164–70 (2009) (reviewing
plurality opinions).
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“[T]he holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken
by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” 231 Although this rule is easy to state and almost second-nature to recite in briefs, it is often confusing in application. 232
Moreover, plurality opinions can result in voting paradoxes which
make it impossible for lower courts to apply any particular rule
from the case. 233 With each of these problems, a special concurrence that leaves less than five Justices in agreement with the rationale of the main opinion can act to diminish the precedential
value of the Court’s decision.
Thus, given the importance of preserving the precedential value
of these core gay rights cases, the argument of this article is that
the liberals should have written regular concurrences supporting
gay rights, not a special concurrence. Only in Romer was there
room to write a special concurrence, as there were six Justices in
the majority. 234 In all of the other cases, the majority opinion was
a five-Justice coalition that would have been reduced to a plurality
with a special concurrence. 235
B. Expansive and Emphatic Concurrences
Besides the basic distinction between regular and special concurring opinions, academics who have studied concurring opinions
have also distinguished them based on their content. Perhaps the
most systematic analysis of concurrences comes from political scientist Pamela Corley in her book on the topic. 236 In her analysis,
there are six different types of concurring opinions: expansive, doctrinal, limiting, reluctant, emphatic, and unnecessary. 237 The basic
231. 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977).
232. Compare Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party,
Hughes v. United States, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (2018) (No. 17-155), with Brief of
Professor Richard M. Re as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Hughes, 584 U.S.
__, 138 S. Ct. 1765 (No. 17-155). See generally Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including
Marks v. United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321
(2000).
233. See generally David S. Cohen, McDonald’s Paradoxical Legacy: State Restrictions of
Non-Citizens’ Gun Rights, 71 MD. L. REV. 1219 (2012) (examining a voting paradox in a
particular case); David S. Cohen, The Precedent-Based Voting Paradox, 90 B.U. L. REV. 183
(2010) (reviewing the literature and theory of various types of voting paradoxes).
234. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 621 (1996).
235. See supra notes 223–24 and accompanying text.
236. See generally CORLEY, supra note 224.
237. Id. at 16. Other authors have used different terminology to classify concurring opinions, but Corley’s is the most well-developed and useful. See also Igor Kirman, Standing
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differences between these types of concurring opinions are as follows:
(1) Expansive concurrence: a regular concurrence that expands
the holding or supplements the reasoning of the majority opinion, often based on an additional legal theory.
(2) Doctrinal concurrence: the basic special concurrence, disagrees with the rationale of the majority opinion and offers a
different theory to support the outcome.
(3) Limiting concurrence: also usually in the form of a special
concurrence, states that part of the majority opinion was unnecessary or tries to limit its reach.
(4) Reluctant concurrence: a regular concurrence that joins the
majority opinion but notes that the author is doing so because
the writer is compelled by precedent or prudence rather than
that the writer believes this is the right reasoning.
(5) Emphatic concurrence: a regular concurrence that emphasizes an aspect of the majority opinion as a way to clarify for
future courts or Justices.
(6) Unnecessary concurrence: a special concurrence in the judgment without any written opinion. 238
In the gay rights cases, the liberals missed an opportunity to
write expansive or emphatic concurrences. The other types of concurrences would have done harm to the precedential value of the
majority opinion, which was not in the best interests of the liberal
Justices. 239 But either an expansive or emphatic concurrence
would have agreed with the majority opinion’s result and rationale
Apart to Be a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Concurring Opinions, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2088–89 (1995) (exploring some of the terminology suggested by others); Laura Krugman Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses of the Concurrence by the
Rehnquist Court, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 777, 784–809 (1990).
238. CORLEY, supra note 224, at 16–19.
239. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 221, at 293 (explaining why conservative Justices have
been more likely to write special concurrences in recent history than liberal Justices).
At least since . . . the beginning of the 1981 term, conservative justices have
constituted a majority. As such, they have less to lose than their opponents
when they fail to avail themselves of their built-in majority to articulate binding policy. The liberals . . . find themselves in the majority far less frequently.
When they do, they may be more reluctant to eviscerate their victory by unyielding adherence to their individual policy preferences.
Id.
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in its entirety, doing no harm to the five-Justice majority. Thus,
without harming the Court’s majority, the liberal Justices could
have written about other important theories that could support
LGBT rights or could have clarified some of the ambiguity stemming from Justice Kennedy’s opaque writing style.
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, we saw the Justices to the right of Justice Kennedy do both of these things with their concurring opinions. Justice Gorsuch wrote an emphatic concurrence that agreed
with Justice Kennedy’s opinion but spent seven pages explaining
in detail just how biased the Commission was against the baker’s
religion. 240 There is no new doctrine or theory in Justice Gorsuch’s
opinion, just further elaboration of the factual basis for his argument that the original administrative hearing was biased against
the plaintiff. 241
In contrast, Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion is styled as
both a regular and a special concurrence. 242 The lengthy section of
his opinion constituting a regular concurrence is a classic example
of an expansive concurrence. In it, Justice Thomas explained why
Colorado violated not only the baker’s free exercise rights, which
was the basis of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, but also the
baker’s free speech rights. To Justice Thomas, baking and decorating a custom cake was expressive conduct. 243 The free speech issue
had been briefed and argued to the Court; 244 however, the majority

240. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U.S. __, __, 138 S.
Ct. 1719, 1734–40 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
241. Id.
242. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). Justice Thomas’s special concurrence opened by noting his disagreement with
the Justice Kennedy’s claim that the record was unclear as to whether the baker refused to
sell any cake to the same-sex couple or whether he simply refused to sell them a custom
cake. Id. Justice Kennedy wrote:
One of the difficulties in this case is that the parties disagree as to the extent
of the baker’s refusal to provide service. If a baker refused to design a special
cake with words or images celebrating the marriage—for instance, a cake
showing words with religious meaning—that might be different from a refusal
to sell any cake at all. In defining whether a baker’s creation can be protected,
these details might make a difference.
Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1723 (majority opinion). As Justice Thomas read the record, the court
of appeals decided that the baker only refused to sell a custom cake. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at
1740 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
243. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1740–45.
244. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24. See generally Brief for Petitioner, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111); Brief for Respondent, Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 584 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (No. 16-111).
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opinion acknowledged the issue but did not address it, instead deciding the case exclusively on the basis of the baker’s right to be
free from religious bias at the administrative hearing. 245 Justice
Thomas’s concurring opinion expanded on the majority’s reasoning, analyzing a separate issue that he believed was important to
resolving this and future disputes. 246
C. Why and When Do Justices Concur?
Unless the Marks rule applies, 247 concurring opinions are not
binding authority. So why and when do Justices write them? Using
sixteen years’ worth of data from the Burger Court, Paul
Wahlbeck, James Spriggs, and Forrest Maltzman answered that
question in 1999. 248 What they found was not surprising—Justices
write concurring opinions to pursue their own policy preferences
when those preferences differ from those of the author of the majority opinion. 249 But what they also found was that there are certain circumstances that make it more likely for a Justice to write
a concurring opinion.
First, the further a Justice is ideologically from the Justice authoring the majority opinion, the more likely there is to be a concurring opinion. 250 Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth explained this
in their discussion of the attitudinal model of judicial decision making:
Those who join the majority opinion are ideologically closer to the
opinion writer than those who write regular concurrences; regular
concurrers, in turn, are ideologically closer to the majority opinion
writer than special concurrers; and to complete the picture, special
concurrers are ideologically closer to the majority opinion writer than
are justices who dissent. 251

245. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U.S. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1723–24.
246. See id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1740–45, 1748 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“[I]n future cases, the freedom of speech could be essential to
preventing Obergefell from being used to ‘stamp out every vestige of dissent’ and ‘vilify
Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy.’” (quoting Obergefell v.
Hodges, 576 U.S. __, __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2642 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting)).
247. See supra notes 231–33 and accompanying text.
248. Paul J. Wahlbeck et al., The Politics of Dissents and Concurrences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 27 AM. POL. Q. 488 (1999).
249. Id. at 489.
250. Id. at 501.
251. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 386–87 (2002).
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In other words, when a majority coalition is made up of Justices
with great ideological disagreement, there is more likely to be a
concurrence.
Wahlbeck and his team found that cases with greater legal complexity also give rise to more concurring opinions. 252 Complex cases
include more legal provisions and issues necessary to the resolution of the cases, which means that there are more axes upon which
the Justices must agree in order to form a stable majority opinion. 253 Simply put, complex cases have more room for disagreement
than simple ones. And if you combine a highly complex case with
ideologically distant Justices, the increased possibility of a concurrence seems obvious.
Second, strategic factors influence whether there will be a concurring opinion. Justices are less likely to write concurring opinions when they have a cooperative relationship with the author of
the majority opinion. 254 As Wahlbeck and his team explain, “Justices are likely to reward colleagues who have cooperated with
them in the past and punish those who have not.” 255
In contrast, Justices are more likely to write concurring opinions
in politically or legally important cases. 256 In cases that are not important, the Justices are more likely to gloss over any disagreement because writing a concurrence is not worth their effort; but
in the important cases, they are more likely to want to express
their different view publicly. 257 The final strategic consideration is
that Justices are less likely to write a special concurrence in a 5–4
case because doing so would destroy the majority. 258 However, the
study found that “this strategic context exerts no influence on regular concurrences.” 259
Finally, the study found that some basic, practical factors influence whether a Justice will write a concurring opinion. When a
Justice has a higher workload, that Justice is less likely to write a

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Wahlbeck et al., supra note 248, at 501–02.
Id. at 502.
Id.
Id. at 496.
Id. at 503.
Id. at 496–97.
Id. at 503.
Id.
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concurring opinion. 260 Likewise, as each annual Term of the Supreme Court draws to a close, Justices are less likely to author a
concurring opinion. 261 These considerations reflect the very real
fact that, as Justice Ginsburg noted, “concurrences are written on
one’s own time.” 262
Professor Corley’s study of concurring opinions added a wrinkle
to Wahlbeck’s team’s study. She took those results and added nuance to them, considering when different types of concurring opinions are written. 263 What she found was that Justices are more
likely to write the two types of concurrences that are of most concern to this article—expansive and emphatic concurrences—in politically or legally important cases. 264 She explained her hypothesis, leading to these findings, similarly to Wahlbeck’s team, but
went into greater detail about the type of concurrence:
In unimportant cases, justices may be willing to ignore their preferences and create an illusion of consensus. Furthermore, the policy implications of an important case are broader. Thus, I expect that a justice will be more likely to write or join a limiting or expansive
concurrence if the case is important. . . . [Also] the emphatic concurrence may be more likely to be written or joined in important cases in
order to provide clarity. 265

Corley also found that emphatic concurrences are more likely
when a case is complex, 266 which makes sense given that her definition of an emphatic concurrence is that it helps to clarify issues. 267 Finally, she found that emphatic concurrences are less
likely when there is a cooperative relationship between the Justices in the majority bloc. 268
Putting these factors together suggests that a concurrence from
one or more of the liberal Justices should have been expected in
one or more of the gay rights cases. The majority bloc in those cases
featured Justice Kennedy and four liberal Justices (and Justice
260. Id. at 504–05.
261. Id.
262. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Writing Separately, 65 WASH. L. REV. 133, 142
(1990).
263. CORLEY, supra note 224, at 26.
264. Id. at 39.
265. Id. at 28.
266. Id. at 39.
267. Id. at 18 (“The fifth category is the emphatic concurrence, which emphasizes some
aspect of the Court’s holding, and functions largely as a means of clarification.”).
268. Id. at 39.
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O’Connor in two of the cases). 269 This ideological difference should
have increased the likelihood of a concurring opinion, as should the
fact that the gay rights cases were complex. Each involved not only
two different constitutional provisions—the Due Process and the
Equal Protection Clauses—but also many different theories under
each provision. 270 Moreover, these cases were politically and legally important, some of the most closely watched decisions in the
Court’s past several decades. Also, while the cases involved close
majorities, the position advocated here is that the Justices should
have written regular concurrences, not special concurrences that
would have broken apart that majority. Finally, there was no obvious special relationship between the four liberal Justices and Justice Kennedy.
In light of these factors, the gay rights cases were ripe for one or
more expansive and/or emphatic concurrences from the liberals on
the Court. They could have used these complex, high-profile cases
to articulate a liberal position on the constitutional rights of gay
people. However, as we know, they did not and instead remained
silent amidst the confusion and moderation from Justice Kennedy
and the inflammatory dissents from the Court’s conservatives. The
last section of this article explores the harm that this silence
caused.
IV. THE HARM OF LIBERAL SILENCE
Concurring opinions can have real value in the law, and the liberal Justices on the Court missed their opportunity to concur in the
core gay rights cases discussed here. What the liberal Justices
missed was the opportunity to send a signal to lower courts and
other legal actors—legislators, the public, even future Supreme
Court Justices—about issues related to LGBT rights. 271 By failing
to take advantage of this opportunity, the liberal Justices weakened the precedential value of the gay rights cases, letting the aggressively homophobic dissents from the conservative members of
the Court linger unanswered in the judicial ether.

269. See generally supra Part I.B.
270. See generally supra Part I.B.
271. CORLEY, supra note 224, at 6 (“Concurrences are the perfect vehicle for sending cues
to other actors because concurring opinions are not the product of compromise as are majority opinions.”).
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Taking a cue from the literature on concurring opinions, it is
clear that the liberal Justices could have used concurring opinions
in these core gay rights cases to accomplish many different goals
and, by failing to do so, hampered these efforts. First, through one
or more concurring opinions, they could have influenced the trajectory of the law on at least three burning questions regarding LGBT
rights: the level of scrutiny for constitutional claims of sexual orientation discrimination; whether Title VII protects against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; and how the Constitution treats claims of transgender discrimination. Second,
concurring opinions could have helped solidify the advances of the
gay rights cases, particularly in light of the Supreme Court’s
changing composition. Third, they could have helped clarify the
doctrine that emerged from these cases. Finally, concurring opinions from Justice Kennedy’s left could have served as important
counter-dissents, addressing some of the vile language from the
Court’s conservatives.
A. Influence Trajectory of Law
The liberal Justices’ failure to write expansive concurrences presents perhaps the most harmful missed opportunity because expansive concurrences increase the likelihood of lower court compliance with Supreme Court precedent. Professor Corley studied the
impact of different types of concurring opinions on lower court compliance, and found that expansive concurrences were the only type
of concurrence that increased this likelihood. 272 As Corley explains,
“expansive concurrences increase lower court compliance by giving
lower court judges more reason to extend the Supreme Court’s reasoning to their specific case.” 273 They do so with supplemental reasoning or additional doctrinal arguments that support the result
that the majority opinion reached. 274 As Professor Corley’s empirical study makes clear, these expansive concurrences are signals for
the lower court judges, “and the lower courts are using these signals.” 275

272. Id. at 84. Doctrinal concurrences decreased the likelihood of compliance, while all
of the remaining types had no effect. Id.
273. Id. at 86.
274. Id. at 76.
275. Id. at 73.
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In the post-Obergefell world, there remain many different, developing issues regarding LGBT rights, 276 but three prominent areas could have greatly benefited from expansive concurring opinions from the liberal Justices. For each of the areas discussed here,
had a liberal position for gay rights been advanced in a concurring
opinion, the lower courts considering these issues could have been
more inclined to use the precedent to further LGBT rights.
1. What Level of Scrutiny for Constitutional Sexual Orientation
Discrimination Claims?
In each Supreme Court case that directly raised the issue of gay
rights, the parties briefed the issue of whether sexual orientation
is a protected class under the Equal Protection Clause. 277 Emblematic is the briefing in Obergefell, in which the Petitioner and the
United States as amicus curiae both argued for heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation classifications. As framed by the Petitioner, the Court should have used the case to state that classifications based on sexual orientation are not entitled to the
presumption of constitutionality that comes with rational basis review. 278 The Petitioner based his argument on the fact that the
Court’s past gay rights decisions—Romer, Lawrence, and Windsor—had “implicitly repudiated the notion that discrimination
based on sexual orientation is presumptively legitimate.” 279
The United States took a different approach. In its brief, it noted
that the Court had failed to previously decide this issue. 280 It then
applied four factors that the Court had previously used to determine whether a characteristic should be analyzed under a standard of heightened scrutiny: a history of past discrimination based
on the classification; the irrelevance of the characteristic to the
ability to perform or contribute to society; the presence of immutable characteristics that define the group; and the lack of political

276. See generally Carpenter, supra note 110.
277. See David Schraub, The Siren Song of Strict Scrutiny, 84 UMKC L. REV. 859, 860–
61 (2016).
278. Brief for Petitioners at 38–39, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584
(2015) (No. 14-556).
279. Id. at 38.
280. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 16, Obergefell, 538 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556) (“This Court has yet to determine what level
of equal-protection scrutiny is appropriate for review of laws that classify based on sexual
orientation.”).
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power for the group. 281 The brief then analyzed these factors, and
concluded that because each was present in the case of sexual orientation, the Court should apply heightened scrutiny. 282
Despite the power of these arguments, their centrality to the
briefs in Obergefell, and their being briefed in each of the LGBT
cases that came before Obergefell, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion once again ignored these arguments and this issue entirely.
Without any concurrence from a liberal Justice, the only mention
of heightened scrutiny appeared in dissenting opinions, and then
only ridiculing Justice Kennedy for his undisciplined reasoning on
this point. 283
As a result, lower courts continue to grapple with the issue without any guidance from the Supreme Court. 284 As Professor Stacey
Sobel has explained, determining the level of scrutiny for sexual
orientation claims is important beyond the cases already decided
by the Supreme Court. 285 Gay people face discrimination in government housing and employment, in family law matters such as
wills and custody, in name change procedures, and in other government functions. 286
Current Supreme Court jurisprudence from the gay rights cases
provides a starting point for analyzing these types of discrimination cases. Justice Kennedy’s rationale for striking down antigay
laws helps when there is animus behind a law or when it impacts
a liberty interest, but that analysis does not go far enough. 287 The
liberal Justices had an opportunity to address these issues with an
expansive concurrence that agreed with Justice Kennedy but also
explained, like Justice Brennan in his Rowland dissent, 288 why
modern equal protection doctrine requires heightened scrutiny for

281. Id. at 16–17.
282. Id. at 17–20.
283. See, e.g., Obergefell, 576 U.S. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2623 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(calling Justice Kennedy’s opinion “difficult to follow”).
284. As the Second Circuit put it in its decision that led to the Supreme Court’s decision
in Windsor, “[w]e think it is safe to say that there is some doctrinal instability in this area.”
Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012).
285. Stacey L. Sobel, When Windsor Isn’t Enough: Why the Court Must Clarify Equal
Protection Analysis for Sexual Orientation Classifications, 24 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
493, 527 (2015).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 499, 530–31.
288. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014–17 (1985) (Brennan,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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sexual orientation. There is no guarantee that such a concurring
opinion would have been used by lower courts to answer this question, but without such liberal guidance in the post-Bowers Supreme Court landscape, lower courts are left with no Supreme
Court guidance whatsoever. And, as Corley’s research shows, such
an opinion would have increased the likelihood that lower courts
could apply such a precedent in expansive ways. 289
2. Do Title VII and Title IX Protect Against Sexual Orientation
Discrimination?
Title VII is the federal law that prohibits discrimination in employment. 290 However, it does not protect against discrimination
based on sexual orientation or gender identity, as the protected
classes defined by the statute are restricted to “race, color, religion,
sex, [and] national origin.” 291 For decades, advocates have pushed
legislators to amend Title VII to include sexual orientation and
gender identity, but to date all such efforts have been unsuccessful. 292 Title IX likewise protects against discrimination in education, but also solely on the basis of sex, not sexual orientation. 293
What does this statutory protection against discrimination have
to do with the constitutional rights addressed in this article? One
of the theories litigants have advanced to try to convince courts to
interpret Title VII and Title IX to cover discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation is that the already-included prohibition on sex
discrimination also covers discrimination based on sexual orientation. 294 There are three different rationales to support this theory:
289. See supra notes 272–75 and accompanying text.
290. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐2(a)(1) (2012).
291. See id.
292. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3, Zarda v. Altitude Express,
Inc., 855 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2017) (No. 15-3775) (including in Addendum A a list of every proposed federal law that would have barred discrimination based on sexual orientation under
Title VII).
293. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012).
294. The Second and Seventh Circuits have recently adopted this theory. See Zarda v.
Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc); Hively v. Ivy Tech
Cmty. Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 340–41 (7th Cir. 2017). The Supreme Court granted review of
Zarda and another Title VII case in April 2019. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Decide
Whether Landmark Civil Rights Law Applies to Gay and Transgender Workers, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/22/us/politics/supreme-court-gaytransgender-employees.html [https://perma.cc/CW6T-KS3C]. Scholars have long argued for
this interpretation of Title VII. See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against
Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 234 (1994); Sylvia A.
Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 229–30;
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(1) that someone who discriminates against Bob for being in a relationship with Gary would not have fired Barbara for being in a
relationship with Gary, so discrimination is based on Bob’s sex; 295
(2) that someone who discriminates against Bob for being in a relationship with Gary is relying on sex-based stereotypes that a
man should be in a relationship with a woman; 296 and (3) that
someone who discriminates against Bob for being in a relationship
with Gary is doing so because of the sex of the people Bob associates with, something that courts have said cannot be done for race
(an employer cannot fire a black employee for being married to or
associated with a white person). 297
These theories have been adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 298 but only sporadically adopted by lower
federal courts. The circuit courts in particular have split on this
issue in the very recent past, with the Second and Seventh Circuits
issuing decisions finding that sexual orientation is protected under
Title VII, while the Eleventh Circuit said sexual orientation is not
protected. 299 The Supreme Court has not yet weighed in, though in
April 2019, it announced that it would hear two Title VII cases on
the issue during its next Term. 300
The Court could have given some guidance on the issue in the
gay rights cases discussed in this article. In each of these cases, the
litigants presented, along with the argument that sexual orientation classifications should be subject to heightened scrutiny, the
argument that the already-existing precedent about sex classifica-

Zachary A. Kramer, Note, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing Gender-Conforming
and Gender-Non-Conforming Homosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 465, 468–
69, 473–74.
295. This is but-for discrimination, a “simple test of whether the evidence shows ‘treatment of a person in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be different.’” City of
L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978).
296. This is discrimination based on sex stereotyping, something the Supreme Court said
was prohibited in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989).
297. This type of associational discrimination has long been prohibited in the lower
courts, though the Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on the issue. See, e.g., Holcomb
v. Iona Coll., 521 F.3d 130, 131–32, 140 (2d Cir. 2008) (exhibiting an associational race discrimination claim); Tetro v. Elliott Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick & GMC Trucks, Inc.,
173 F.3d 988, 990, 993–94 (6th Cir. 1999).
298. Baldwin v. Foxx, EEOC Decision No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *2, *4 (July
15, 2015).
299. Zarda, 883 F.3d at 108; Hively, 853 F.3d at 340–41; Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850
F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017).
300. Liptak, supra note 294.
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tions should cover the discrimination at issue in the sexual orientation cases. For example, an amicus brief in Obergefell from legal
scholars directly raised this issue, 301 and Chief Justice Roberts was
intrigued enough by this argument that he asked a question about
it at oral argument. 302 However, like the sexual orientation classification argument, Justice Kennedy repeatedly ignored this sex
classification argument in his majority opinion in that case as well
as the others where it has been raised.
Had the liberal Justices used a concurring opinion to address
this sex discrimination argument, as many lower court judges have
done, 303 it not only could have helped expand the Court’s precedent
into the equal protection issues addressed above, but it also could
have helped in Title VII and Title IX cases. No doubt an opinion
from a Justice supporting the sex discrimination argument under
the Constitution would be a powerful resource for other jurists in
the effort to use sex discrimination as the basis for prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII and Title IX. Although the statutory and constitutional protections do not perfectly
overlap, courts do look to one when interpreting the other. 304 By
failing to address this issue in a concurring opinion, the liberal Justices missed an opportunity to further protect gay people through
its already clear prohibition of sex discrimination under statutory
antidiscrimination law.

301. Brief Amicus Curiae of Legal Scholars Stephen Clark et al. at 8–9, 20–21, 32, Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-571, 14-574, 14-578).
302. Chief Justice Roberts asked, “I’m not sure it’s necessary to get into sexual orientation to resolve this case. I mean, if Sue loves Joe and Tom loves Joe, Sue can marry him and
Tom can’t. And the difference is based upon their different sex. Why isn’t that a straightforward question of sexual discrimination?” Adam Liptak, Gender Bias Issue Could Tip Chief
Justice Roberts into Ruling for Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2015), https://www.ny
times.com/2015/04/30/us/gender-bias-could-tip-chief-justice-roberts-into-ruling-for-gay-mar
riage.html [https://perma.cc/H2SQ-7UG2].
303. See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 479 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring)
(“I write separately because I am persuaded that Idaho and Nevada’s same-sex marriage
bans are also unconstitutional for another reason: They are classifications on the basis of
gender that do not survive the level of scrutiny applicable to such classifications.”); Baker
v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 898 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“I would grant the requested relief and enjoin defendants from denying plaintiffs a marriage license based solely on the sex of the applicants.”).
304. David S. Cohen, Title IX: Beyond Equal Protection, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 217,
222–23 (2005).
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3. Do Existing Statutes and Constitutional Provisions Protect
Trans People from Discrimination?
Gavin Grimm was poised to make Supreme Court history when
the Trump Administration pulled the rug out from under him.
While a high school student, Grimm was being treated for severe
gender dysphoria. 305 Grimm had been assigned female at birth, but
identified as male. 306 As part of the process of socially transitioning
in all parts of his life, he sought to use the boys’ restroom at his
high school. 307 Grimm did so for two months without any problem,
but the school board, after receiving complaints from some parents,
instituted a new policy that required transgender students to use
an alternative private bathroom rather than the school bathrooms
consistent with their identity. 308 Grimm objected to the stigmatizing segregation and brought a federal lawsuit under both the
Equal Protection Clause and Title IX. 309
As much as the Supreme Court has addressed gay rights in the
cases discussed in this article, it has barely touched on the topic of
transgender rights. 310 For a short time, Grimm’s case seemed that
it would be the vehicle to change that. After initially losing in the
district court, Grimm won in the Fourth Circuit, which found that
Title IX applied to Grimm’s case. 311 The Supreme Court then
granted the school district’s petition for certiorari. 312 However, just
before oral argument in the case, the Trump Administration
changed the Obama Administration’s Title IX guidance, upon
which Grimm had relied. 313 As a result, the Supreme Court vacated
the Fourth Circuit’s previous judgment and remanded the case for
further consideration. 314 On remand, the district court ruled that
Grimm had sufficiently pled both Title IX and Equal Protection
305. G.G. v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d 709, 715 (4th Cir. 2016).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 715–16.
309. Id. at 717.
310. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994) (addressing Eighth Amendment liability in a prison case about the housing of a transgender prisoner, but failing to
address transgender rights).
311. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 822 F.3d at 714–15.
312. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016) (mem.).
313. Sandra Battle, Acting Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights, Office for Civil Rights, U.S.
Dep’t of Educ. & T.E. Wheeler, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen. for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Dear Colleague Letter 1 (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list
/ocr/letters/colleague-201702-title-ix.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQU2-9J64].
314. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd. v. G.G., 580 U.S. __, 137 S. Ct. 1239 (2017) (mem.).
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Clause claims of discrimination based on his transgender status
and allowed his case to move forward. 315 For now, though, the Supreme Court still has not addressed this or related issues, though
along with the Title VII sexual orientation cases that it agreed to
hear in April 2019, it also agreed to hear a Title VII gender identity
case during its next Term. 316
The Supreme Court’s silence on transgender rights under the
Equal Protection Clause, Title VII, and Title IX has, so far, left the
issue entirely up to discretion of the lower courts. The most relevant Supreme Court precedent employed by the lower courts is
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Title VII case that held sex stereotyping is a form of unlawful employment discrimination. 317 Under that theory, courts have held that discrimination on the basis
of transgender or transitioning status is a form of sex stereotyping
because such treatment “punishes that individual for his or her
gender non-conformance.” 318 Although many of the lower courts
considering the issue have agreed, not all have. 319 Yet, until the
Supreme Court resolves the matter next Term, the issue will continue to arise. Lower courts will continue to grapple with whether
President Trump’s ban on transgender individuals serving in the
military violates the Constitution, whether private employees can
fire transgender individuals outside of the bounds of protection under Title VII, and whether schools can require transgender students to use separate bathrooms under Title IX.
The argument here is no different than previously articulated.
With an expansive concurrence in the gay rights cases, the liberal
Justices could have helped influence the trajectory of the law in the
area of transgender rights. None of the cases discussed earlier was
actually about transgender rights, so it would have been too much
to expect an expansive concurrence to address transgender rights
specifically. However, several of the theories that an expansive
315. Grimm v. Gloucester Cty. Sch. Bd., 302 F. Supp. 3d 730, 752 (E.D. Va. 2018).
316. See Liptak, supra note 294.
317. 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989).
318. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist., 858 F.3d 1034, 1049 (7th Cir. 2017); see
also EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 600 (6th Cir. 2018).
319. See, e.g., Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1218, 1221–23, 1228 (10th
Cir. 2007) (holding that Etsitty was discriminated against on the basis of being “transsexual,” but that this is not a protected class); Ulane v. E. Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1087
(7th Cir. 1984) (holding that Ulane was not discriminated against as a woman); see also
Wittmer v. Phillips 66 Co., No. 18-20251, 2019 WL 458405, at *4 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2019)
(holding that transgender discrimination does not violate Title VII).
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concurrence could have legitimately addressed about gay rights
could have impacted the fight for transgender rights.
For instance, as noted earlier, one of the prominent theories explaining how sexual orientation discrimination is a form of sex discrimination is that it is a form of gender stereotyping. 320 A powerful concurring opinion explaining the basis for this theory could
easily be extrapolated into the area of transgender discrimination,
which several courts have found is a form of gender stereotyping. 321
Alternatively, an expansive concurrence that laid out the basis for
including sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect class could establish the groundwork for doing the same with transgender status or
gender identity more generally. 322 In these and other ways, the expansive concurrence would not need to directly address
transgender discrimination in order to have the beneficial effect
ascribed to such concurrences by Corley—increasing the likelihood
that lower courts look to the case as useful precedent for this new
situation.
B. Solidifying Advances at the Supreme Court
Concurrences decrease the likelihood that lower courts, as well
as the Supreme Court in future cases, will follow a majority opinion. Previous studies have found that the more concurrences a Supreme Court decision has, the more likely it is to be overruled by
the Supreme Court in the future. 323 The authors of that study explained that “concurrences lower the credibility of a precedent and
offer alternative legal rationales.” 324
However, Corley’s method of classifying different types of concurrences shows that not all concurrences are created equal in this
regard. In fact, what she found was that while doctrinal concurrences—special concurrences that disagree with proposed doctrine
and propose a different basis for the decision—decrease the likelihood that the Supreme Court will follow its own precedent (a result
320. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989); R.G. & G.R. Harris
Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d at 600; Whitaker, 858 F.3d at 1049.
321. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d at 571; Whitaker, 858 F.3d at
1049.
322. See Doe 1 v. Trump, 275 F. Supp. 3d 167, 208 (D.D.C. 2017) (articulating the criteria
through which a suspect class could be created).
323. James F. Spriggs, II & Thomas G. Hansford, Explaining the Overruling of U.S. Supreme Court Precedent, 63 J. POL. 1091, 1095 (2001).
324. Id. at 1105.
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consistent with earlier studies), expansive concurrences increase
the likelihood that the Supreme Court will follow its own precedent. 325 As she explains it, “An expansive concurrence signals [to
future Courts] that the majority opinion did not go far enough and
that the justices writing or joining this type of concurrence would
go farther in the future.” 326 Moreover, when there is an expansive
concurrence, the probability of positive treatment by the Supreme
Court in the future is, using Corley’s words, “quite substantial,” as
she found that the likelihood nears one hundred percent. 327
The liberal Justices missed the opportunity to use an expansive
concurrence to increase the likelihood that the gay rights decisions
are followed and treated positively in future Supreme Court cases,
like the three Title VII cases it will hear next Term. So far, each of
the cases the Court has decided has been followed and treated positively, as Lawrence built on Romer, Windsor built on those two,
and Obergefell built on all three. However, with Justice Kavanaugh replacing Justice Kennedy in 2018, the Supreme Court is
likely going to become even more conservative than it already is. 328
The slim majorities in the gay rights cases make it possible that
when the Title VII cases come before the Justices next Term, the
more conservative Supreme Court could chip away at, or even overturn, these precedents. Although there is of course no guarantee, 329
the liberal Justices could have increased the likelihood of the gay
rights precedent being followed in the future if they had authored
an expansive concurrence. Failing to do so put the precedent in a
weaker position for future reconsideration.
C. Clarity
As noted above, Justice Kennedy’s core gay rights majority opinions reached clear results but relied upon confusing, opaque reasoning. When he based his decisions on the Equal Protection
325. CORLEY, supra note 224, at 90–91.
326. Id. at 90.
327. She found the baseline probability to be 0.561, and the probability with an expansive concurrence to be 0.960. Id. at 91.
328. See Oliver Roeder & Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, How Conservative Is Brett Kavanaugh?, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 17, 2018), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/howconservative-is-brett-kavanaugh/ [https://perma.cc/YN47-AYH7].
329. See CORLEY, supra note 224, at 90–91 (finding that ideological differences between
the original Court and the Court considering the precedent decrease the likelihood of the
precedent being treated positively).
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Clause, he relied on the difficult-to-constrain doctrine of animus
and the widely criticized “rational basis plus” theory. 330 His decisions based on the Due Process Clause were even harder to follow,
as he refused to apply standards of review developed in previous
cases, labeled some rights fundamental and others merely liberty,
and mixed in equality principles without carefully parsing the difference. 331 Many of the dissenting opinions lambasted Justice Kennedy for the doctrinal mess he created, and even for those who
agree with the results Justice Kennedy reached, it is easy to agree
with the dissents’ critiques. 332
Without taking anything away from the precedential value of
Justice Kennedy’s majority, one or more liberal Justices could have
written an emphatic concurrence to clarify portions of Justice Kennedy’s opinions. Although Corley’s studies indicate that emphatic
concurrences do not have any effect on lower court compliance with
Supreme Court precedent, nor with Supreme Court adherence to
its own precedent, 333 it seems almost axiomatic that they would
have an effect beyond compliance or adherence to precedent.
For instance, when a Supreme Court concurrence clarifies otherwise murky doctrine in the majority opinion, scholars have theorized that the opinion will “provide[] an essential adjustment to
the majority’s imperfect focus.” 334 The audience is lower courts,
lawyers, and scholars who are trying to make sense of what the
majority wrote, and sometimes help from another Justice could be
what tips the reader into understanding what the majority
meant. 335 It might not bring about greater compliance, as Corley’s
study found, but it can certainly assist in greater understanding.
This theorized impact has already played out in the case of Justice Kagan’s emphatic concurrence in Masterpiece Cakeshop. In
that concurrence, she explained her understanding of exactly why
the Colorado administrative decision was biased against religion
and laid out just how easy it would have been for the agency to

330. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634–35 (1996).
331. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003).
332. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 794 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(discussing the majority’s lack of a deferential framework); id. at 811 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(questioning whether the majority analysis fits within this framework).
333. CORLEY, supra note 224, at 84, 91.
334. Ray, supra note 237, at 829.
335. See also id. at 799–800.
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reach the same legal conclusion without religious bias. 336 She also
emphasized that “a vendor cannot escape a public accommodations
law because his religion disapproves selling a product to a group of
customers, whether defined by sexual orientation, race, sex, or
other protected trait.” 337 The same week that Masterpiece
Cakeshop was decided, the Arizona Court of Appeals used Justice
Kagan’s concurring opinion to support its conclusion that a Phoenix antidiscrimination law could be applied against religious owners of a wedding artwork business. 338 That court cited the clear
statement from Justice Kagan’s concurrence that religion cannot
be the basis for excusing compliance with antidiscrimination
law. 339
Emphatic concurrences in the direct gay rights cases could have
done the same. Just as Justice Kagan’s concurrence helped the Arizona Court of Appeals choose between two different readings of
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, a clarifying concurrence could
have assisted the lower courts in choosing between different readings of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinions in, for instance, Lawrence and Windsor. Both resulted in lower courts being unclear
about Justice Kennedy’s holding, 340 and an emphatic concurrence
might have tipped the balance in this regard. By remaining silent
throughout this series of cases, the liberals missed their opportunity to provide this clarity.

336. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 584 U.S. __, __, 138 S.
Ct. 1719, 1732–34 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring). Justice Gorsuch’s separate concurring
opinion was in direct response to Justice Kagan’s concurrence. He wrote that
[i]n the face of so much evidence suggesting hostility toward Mr. Phillips’s sincerely held religious beliefs, two of our colleagues have written separately to
suggest that the Commission acted neutrally toward his faith when it treated
him differently from the other bakers—or that it could have easily done so consistent with the First Amendment. But, respectfully, I do not see how we might
rescue the Commission from its error.
Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1734 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
337. Id. at __, 138 S. Ct. at 1733 n.* (Kagan, J., concurring).
338. Brush & Nib Studio v. City of Phoenix, 418 P.3d 426, 443–44, 443 n.13 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2018).
339. Id. at 443 n.13.
340. On Lawrence, compare Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 743–44
(5th Cir. 2008), striking down Texas’ ban on sex toys under Lawrence, with Williams v.
Attorney General of Alabama, 378 F.3d 1232, 1236–38 (11th Cir. 2004), upholding Alabama’s
ban on sex toys under Lawrence. On Windsor, compare Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d
410, 430–31 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (striking down Pennsylvania’s ban on same-sex marriage under
Windsor), with Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 915–17, 927 (E.D. La. 2014) (upholding Louisiana’s ban on same-sex marriage under Windsor).
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D. Counterdissents
Within the realm of emphatic concurrences, there is a particular
type called the “counterdissent.” As explained by Professor Gerald
Dunne decades ago, in a counterdissent, “the Justice who wrote the
opinion was concerned not so much with the traditional role of explaining the judgment of the court . . . [r]ather, it was all counter
attack, a dissent from dissent, so to speak, in which the writer assailed those in disagreement with the majority . . . .” 341 Majority
opinions often include responses to dissenters, but sometimes the
author of the majority opinion chooses to leave the dissent unanswered, or takes a more restrained approach in responding to an
over-the-top dissent in order to take the higher ground or not detract from the Court’s opinion. When that happens, other Justices
who joined the majority can take on the task by writing a counterdissent.
Academic literature has given almost no attention to counterdissents as a general matter, but the nature of this type of concurring
opinion leads to some common-sense observations. Concurrences
as counterdissents make the most sense when the majority opinion
refrains from addressing the dissent. In the four direct gay rights
cases, Justice Kennedy responded to a dissent just one time, but
he did so in a very limited way. In Romer, Justice Scalia’s dissent
claimed that the Supreme Court had previously approved a law
that targeted polygamists by making them ineligible to vote or hold
government office. 342 That earlier case, Davis v. Beason, was proof
to Justice Scalia that Colorado’s Amendment 2 was within the generally noncontroversial tradition of states depriving groups of people who engage in morally reprehensible conduct of certain rights
in civil society. 343 Justice Kennedy responded to this line of argument in his opinion, claiming the parts of Davis targeting a particular group of people based on their status or advocacy are “no
longer good law,” but that if it is interpreted as merely allowing
341. Gerald T. Dunne, Justices Hugo Black and Robert Jackson: The Great Feud, 19 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 465, 468 (1975); see also United States v. N.Y.C., New Haven & Hartford R.R.
Co., 276 F.2d 525, 549 (2d Cir. 1959) (Clark, J., dissenting) (referring to an opinion responding to his dissent as a “counterdissent”); JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE
OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE WILEY RUTLEDGE 273 (2004) (referring to the “counterdissent” as “a new species of opinion concurring with [the majority] for the sole purpose
of scolding” the dissent).
342. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 649–50 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890)).
343. Id.
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states to deny the right to vote to convicted felons, it is “unexceptionable.” 344 Justice Scalia then responded to this point in a
lengthy footnote in his dissent. 345
Other than this brief exchange about an esoteric precedent from
the late 19th century, Justice Kennedy allowed the dissents in all
of the gay rights cases to go unanswered. That means that Justice
Kennedy left unanswered: Justice Scalia’s cries of culture war in
Romer 346 and prediction of the end of prohibitions on bestiality and
pedophilia in Lawrence; 347 Chief Justice Roberts’ comparisons to
Dred Scott and Lochner in Obergefell; 348 Justice Alito’s concern
that same-sex marriage would destroy families in both Windsor 349
and Obergefell, 350 as well as his outrageous prophecy in Obergefell
that those who oppose gay rights will be physically attacked for
refusing to remain silent; 351 and Justice Thomas’s claims that liberty and dignity are better served by allowing states to prohibit
gay couples from marrying in Obergefell, 352 and that same-sex marriage would threaten religious liberty. 353
Given Justice Kennedy’s failure to answer this antigay rhetoric
and argument in any of his majority opinions, the liberal Justices
could have jumped in with counterdissents to respond to some of
these claims, but they did not. As a result, the bigotry and apocalyptic predictions apparent throughout these opinions were left unanswered, at least directly. Counterdissents would not have wiped
these claims from the pages of the United States Reports, but they
could have addressed these points with the authority of a Supreme
Court Justice and tried to tamp down any effect they might have

344. Id. at 634 (majority opinion).
345. Id. at 650 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
346. Id. at 636.
347. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
348. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2616–22 (2015) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
349. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 809–10 (Alito, J., dissenting).
350. Obergefell, 576 U.S. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2641–42 (Alito, J., dissenting).
351. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2642–43.
352. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2631–40 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
353. Id. at __, 135 S. Ct. at 2638.
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in future cases. 354 They could have also served as a powerful counterpoint in the discussion of the cases among the general public,
which often included references to the dissents’ quips. 355
CONCLUSION
No one knows exactly why the liberal Justices have been silent
on gay rights for decades. Perhaps Justice Kennedy required (or
they felt Justice Kennedy required) their silence in order to vote
the way he did on these landmark cases. Perhaps they thought
they would leave well enough alone and wait for these concerns to
arise another day. Perhaps they did draft concurring opinions, but
Justice Kennedy responded to them by making changes that addressed the concurrence’s concerns. Perhaps they just did not have
the time or thought that on balance the effort would not be worth
the payoff. Or, perhaps, they really believe that Justice Kennedy’s
opinions could not be improved upon. 356
Whatever the reason for this liberal silence, though, the jurisprudence around LGBT rights in this country is poorer as a result,
and the future trajectory more concerning. Concurring opinions,
such as the expansive or emphatic concurrence, that do not diminish the effect of the majority opinion would have been the perfect
vehicle for the liberal Justices to have developed a clearer and more
powerful vision for LGBT rights under the Constitution.
As it is, without these concurring opinions, lower courts, future
Supreme Courts, other political actors, and the general public are
left with Justice Kennedy’s cramped and cloudy view of LGBT
rights. That view has undoubtedly advanced the cause with major
wins, but it has stunted progress in other areas. As the post-Kennedy Court now embarks on deciding three sure-to-be-landmark
cases on LGBT discrimination under Title VII, it is time to recognize that the liberals lost their opportunity to solidify these gains,

354. Lee Epstein et al., Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical
Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 126 (2011) (“Although there are famous examples of
Supreme Court dissents that later became the law, the average Supreme Court dissent is
not heavily cited, even in the lower courts.”).
355. See, e.g., Tina Nguyen, The Bitchiest Quotes from Scalia’s Gay Marriage Dissent,
VANITY FAIR (June 26, 2015), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/06/scalia-dissent-gaymarriage-ruling-2015 [https://perma.cc/BK5P-5UC3].
356. See generally CORLEY, supra note 224, at 21–39 (examining the reasons Justices do
and do not write concurring opinions).
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as they are more likely to be speaking from the position of dissent
in the future.

